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ACT  Artemisinin combination treatment
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AP Annual Plan
ARV Antiretroviral
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DD Demand driven
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DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
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HA Health advisor
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HoM Head of mission
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IDP Internally displaced person
KA Kala  azar 
KNCV  Koninklijk Nederlandsche Centrale Vereeniging
MAM Moderate acute malnutrition
MedCo Medical coordinator
MDR-TB Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
MH Mental health
MoH Ministry of Health
MSF-B MSF-Belgium
MSF-H MSF-Holland
MSF-OCA MSF-Operational  Centre  Amsterdam 
MT Management Team
MTP Medium term policy
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OD Operational director
PHD Public Health Department
PMTCT Prevention of mother-to-child transmission
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder
QC Quality control
RDT  Rapid diagnostic test
RH Reproductive health
RHU Refugee Health Unit
RUTF Ready-to-use therapeutic food
SAM Severe acute malnutrition
SFP Supplementary feeding programme
STI Sexually transmitted infection
TB Tuberculosis
TFP Therapeutic feeding programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VCT Voluntary counselling and testing 
Watsan Water and sanitation
WHO World Health Organization
WHS Water, hygiene and sanitation
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Goma, Kibumba camp, Rwandese refugees. Photo: © Henk Braam
On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi were killed when their plane was shot down as
they returned to Kigali from talks in Arusha. The genocide following the plane crash was masterminded by extremist politicians intent on
manipulating tensions between Hutus and Tutsi in order to decimate the opposition. By June 1994, an estimated 500,000 to one million
people had been massacred. On July 4 1994, as RPF took control of Kigali, defeated government officials used radio broadcasts to invoke
hysteria about the likely retribution for the crimes committed and incited the population to flee, thus prompting the fastest refugee exodus in
recent history. Among the refugee population were many of those responsible for the genocide. In less than a week more than 700,000
people crossed the border into Zaire, creating a humanitarian disaster on an unprecedented scale. Cholera and dysentery and dehydration
due to lack of water quickly swept through the crowded camps and within one month an estimated 50,000 refugees died. 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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MSF's international movement is debating
governance models in order to manage
the unprecedented growth of the
organisation and to adapt to evolving
external changes. Within MSF-H, out of
which grew the MSF-Operational Centre
Amsterdam (MSF-OCA), there is also a
period of strategic planning.  Some in
MSF-OCA suggest that the organisation
needs to re-invent itself. Others insist that
the needs and reasons for it continue to
exist as starkly as they did in 1984. At this
key point in the organisation's history, it is
instructive to look back at the years of
medical humanitarian assistance, to
review how the organisation has adapted
medically to the external and internal
challenges, and to learn from both the
successes and failures. This paper does
not aim to be a full history of the
organisation nor review the geo-political
context in which MSF-H works; rather it
attempts to look through a medical lens
at the past 25 years of medical action by
MSF-H. 
The beginning
Médecins Sans Frontières was started in
1971 by a group of French doctors and
journalists frustrated by the inability of the
International Committee of the Red Cross
to respond effectively to the crisis in
Biafra. It was the first independent non-
governmental organisational focusing on
bringing emergency medical aid. The
success of the French doctors led to new
MSFs starting in Belgium and Switzerland
in 1980. A group of Dutch doctors
working with the Belgium and French
sections came together and decided to
start a Dutch section of MSF. The first
office was in the basement of a house
belonging to the mother of one of the
founders. Initially the group recruited
doctors to work with MSF-Belgium (MSF-
B), sending their first doctor to Chad in
1984 to respond to the havoc wreaked by
war, drought and famine. Soon the new
section took on its own projects and
missions. 
Early days: 1984-88
The first MSF-H independent project was
a response to cholera in Somalia, in the
Gannad refugee camp, under the overall
country direction of MSF-B. The Dutch
team of three doctors, three nurses, a
medical coordinator and logistician
arrived with 15 tons of medical supplies.
The camp consisted of makeshift shelters,
had little drinking water and no latrines.
The team set up a cholera treatment
centre, installed a mere five latrines and
got to work. It took two-and-a-half
months, but the cholera was brought
under control, at which point the team
moved on to provide general medical
services in the camp.
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The first entirely independent mission was
to Sudan in 1985 - a country where MSF
continues to work 25 years later. The call
was in response to a famine in north
Darfur. MSF was charged with providing
supplementary feeding. There was little
practical experience among the team in
providing this, and the logistical
challenges of reaching remote villages
were great. Unfortunately the Dutch
teams arrived just as the peak of the
famine was over.  Nevertheless the team
enthusiastically distributed sugar, dried
skimmed milk powder and oil to all
villages where more than 10 percent of
the children were malnourished. Soon it
was recognised that the nutritional
emergency was over, but the team had
become aware of the abysmal state of the
healthcare centres in the villages and
proposed to rehabilitate them. This idea
was hotly debated in Amsterdam, since it
was outside the strict emergency
mandate of the organisation, but it was
eventually approved. At a board meeting
in April 1986, it was officially agreed to
add rehabilitation projects to MSF's
emergency assistance role. Darfur was
given the go-ahead for a rehabilitation
project to train healthcare workers, equip
health centres and provide medicines.
The strict condition was that the project
was to last only one-and-a-half years. The
project ended up demanding significant
technical support and expertise from
Amsterdam, and was one of the main
responsibilities of the first member of the
Medical Department. Despite the strict
timeframe given by the board, it was not
closed until 1990.  
Several of the earliest projects were
responses to natural disasters under the
MSF-Holland was 25 years old in 2009. The anniversary was a fitting time
to look back on a quarter century of medical humanitarian action. A
conference in September 2010 brought together experts to identify the
lessons learned and the future challenges and adaptations needed by
humanitarians to continue to operate in a changing environment. 
25 Years of Medical
Humanitarian Action
1  Haan A, Lute E, Bender R. 10 years Emergency Aid Worldwide. Médecins Sans Frontières 1994; p. 17.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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umbrella of MSF-B. In 1985, news of an
earthquake in Mexico City prompted
MSF-H to send out an immediate
assessment team. Within 72 hours, a
Hercules plane took off with a surgical
team, medicines, tents and two vehicles.
By the time the team landed, the
immediate medical emergency was over
and Mexican doctors had the situation
under control. MSF intervened
temporarily - working on water supply
and giving support to health structures -
but the mission did not get established
much beyond an assessment mission. 
Two months later, the Nevado del Ruiz
volcano in Colombia erupted, leading to a
mudslide that buried an entire village and
made 20,000 people homeless. Two days
later a charter plane left Europe with 22
tons of supplies. This time the team was
able to start work immediately. A
makeshift hospital with dispensary and
operating theatre were set up in a
building on a coffee plantation. MSF was
the first emergency aid organisation on
site, and was able to respond to major
needs. 
Still the evaluation of these responses to
natural disasters was not wholly positive
in Amsterdam.
In terms of publicity, these were highly
successful missions. Logistics in Europe were
also successful. Less successful: coordination
with Belgium and the late arrival and
inadequate preparation of the team. As a
result, we hardly did anything. Lesson for
later: set up a stand-by emergency team
that is ready to leave in less than 12 hours.
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These minutes reflect a number of themes
to be repeated and developed over time:
the difficulty in responding to medical
and surgical needs in natural disasters
when MSF is not already on the ground,
and the challenges of coordination with
other MSF sections. Three other major
natural disasters would be responded to
in MSF-H's first five years: flooding in
Sudan (1988), a hurricane in Nicaragua
(1988), and an earthquake in Armenia
(1988). 
Two events in the early days forced the
organisation to examine the principle of
neutrality and the responsibility of
medical people faced with gross human
rights abuses to speak out. In 1987, two
MSF doctors working in Wau in southern
Sudan in the midst of the war found
themselves witness to a massacre of the
Dinka by government forces.  As one of
the doctors wrote: 
"Everything God and Amnesty International
have forbidden is happening here with a
vengeance. Every Dinka has become a
legitimate target for attack."
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The security was so poor that one doctor
escaped through the war zone and the
other was evacuated by air to Khartoum.
There was fierce debate in Amsterdam
over what to do. There was no possibility
of remaining silent about such massive
abuses, and yet there was a serious risk
that denouncing them would jeopardise
other MSF projects in north Sudan. In the
end, MSF gave eyewitness accounts to a
journalist whose report, Sudan's Secret
Slaughter, was published and MSF was
able to continue operating while the
world was alerted to the situation in south
Sudan. 
The second event was the poison gas
attacks on Kurds by Saddam Hussein in
1988. MSF heard from several sources of
a terrible attack in northern Iraq targeting
the Kurdish population. The presidents of
MSF-H and MSF-B investigated and found
a horrific situation: 
"It was a ghost town. There were dead
people everywhere, civilians who had met
sudden death in the middle of their daily
activities...Their faces, lips, and nails were
blue. We estimate the number of direct
victims at anywhere between a thousand
and five thousand."
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The judgment was that there had been a
poison gas attack, using cyanide and
mustard gas. Samples were taken to verify
this at Ghent University. They confirmed
the use of gas. A response was mounted
for the survivors and a press conference
was called. For the first time MSF-H
publicly denounced a regime for the
atrocities witnessed. Within the MSF-H
office, this move provoked fierce debate
about the compatibility of public
denunciation with the principle of
neutrality. Some resolved this dilemma
pragmatically by concluding that
neutrality is less a principle and more a
means by which to achieve access to
populations in need.  
This discussion was also taking place
internationally. The first version of the
MSF charter stated that MSF should avoid
being engaged in a government's internal
policy and field volunteers should not
publicly voice their opinions on what they
had seen
5. The French had already
abandoned this principle in practice and
fought for a change in the charter in the
first formal international meeting of the
six MSF sections held in Toulouse in 1989.
The Dutch initially resisted, but eventually
agreed to an amendment. The
confidentiality clauses were deleted from
the charter, and while there was no
mention of an obligation to speak out, it
was no longer prohibited. Ironically, 20
years after the charter was so decisively
changed, MSF found itself agreeing to
sign confidentiality clauses in its
memoranda of understanding with
governments such as Sri Lanka in order to
continue its medical activities. Again there
was heated debate, but this time the
clauses were accepted. 
The early projects consisted mainly of
delivering basic healthcare, including
vaccinations, surgery, malnutrition and
Armenia was the first mission in the Eastern Bloc and is remembered best in some
quarters for its dialysis project. On request of an Armenian hospital, kidney dialysis
machines and supplies along with nephrologists from Dutch hospitals were flown in
to deal with the kidney failure secondary to crush syndrome. As one expat present
remembers it, it was “disastrous”. This was the first and last time the Dutch section
would attempt to provide dialysis in an earthquake response. 
2 Ibid. p. 24
3 Ibid. p. 27
4 Ibid. p. 30
5 The second principle of the original charter reads: All doctors and nurses working for MSF shall maintain professional secrecy. They shall refrain
from publicly expressing any opinion in respect to the situation in any of the areas where MSF is operating.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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responding to outbreaks. The response
then was less comprehensive than
today's, and much less standardised.
Doctors would sometimes see up to 200
patients a day, handing out large
quantities of antimalarials for fevers, basic
antibiotics for respiratory infections and
paracetemol for aches and pains. Teams
were very independent in determining
what kind of programmes to offer and
how to deliver them. This was seen
positively, particularly in terms of project
development, as the teams were free to
innovate in order to meet the needs in
front of them.
6 The independence of the
teams was based on several practical
realities - the logistical difficulties of
communicating with headquarters, and
the lack of headquarters staff to back up
the teams. In 1987, there were just two
project managers, both physicians, who
were responsible for supporting all of the
field operations.  
6 Interview Barbara Lopes-Cardozo, Founding Member MSF-Holland
7 Interview Riekje Elema, Health advisor, 30 July 2010
On the other hand, medically some teams
were floundering: 
“In Uganda, we were suddenly faced with
malnutrition and had to design a response
to that all by ourselves. We were literally
inventing the recipes for the supplementary
feeding programme.”
7
Projects like the rehabilitation of health
centres in Darfur demanded more expert
support. A medical working group
consisting mainly of returned field
volunteers acted as a kind of think tank
and resource to the project teams. They
drafted several papers for the project
teams on topics such as immunisation
and were able to respond to questions
from field expats. 
Turkey refugee camp. 
Photo: © Jan Van Veen
Refugee camp ‘Isikveren’ for Kurdish
refugees, fleeing Iraq after the Gulf war.
Doctor Henk Hammer is working as a
volunteer at the camp. In just a couple of
days, thousands of tents appeared on the
mountain sides near the Turkish-Iraqi
border. About 55,000 Kurds were fleeing
from Saddam Hussein’s troops. For MSF this
operation was one of its biggest since the
creation of the movement.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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Gannad refugee camp in North West
Somalia (now Somaliland), was the
site of the first MSF-H project in
1984. In October 1985, a further
influx of refugees led to the decision
to relocate the camp into three new
sites. MSF-H was asked to work with
the Somalia government's Refugee
Health Unit (RHU) to implement
medical activities in one of the new
sites in Biyoley. 
In coordination with the RHU, the
MSF-H team planned and
implemented medical and
nutritional activities for the
population of 27,000 refugees.
Services included outpatient care,
maternal child health, an overnight
observation centre, a TB clinic, two
intensive feeding centres and three
supplementary feeding centres.
Referral services were available in
nearby cities for medical and surgical
emergencies. A visiting eye team
held weekly clinics and identified
cases of cataract for surgery in a
nearby city. An MSF-H administrator
also requested funding to install
playground equipment in the camp.
His proposal included hand-drawn
pictures of swing sets, slides and a
wooden donkey mounted on a
metal spring.   
The tuberculosis programme was
transferred over from Gannad Camp.
In its first months, 150 patients were
under daily observed treatment in
the clinic. Defaulter tracing was
done by community health workers.
Standardised reporting on outcomes
was not done, but few defaulters
and deaths were recorded in the
medical reports. 
An early MSF-Holland Intervention
Biyoley Refugee Camp: 1986-87
Nutritional deficiencies were a serious
problem. The refugees were dependent
on the food ration distributed by the
World Food Programme. In the antenatal
care programme, in one month there
were 10 maternal deaths attributed to
anaemia. A randomly selected group of
60 children revealed 90 percent to be
anaemic with haemoglobin under ten
grammes. MSF-H lobbied for the food
ration to be improved to include minimal
quantities of iron, and for routine
supplementation with iron tablets be
done for high-risk groups. In the feeding
programmes, iron sulphate powder was
added to the milk. A 'liver programme' for
pregnant woman was piloted, and results
showed that women supplemented with
fresh liver doubled their haemoglobin in a
period of one month. 
Cases of bleeding gums and painful
swollen joints started to be seen in
increasing numbers in the clinics. Scurvy,
caused by a deficiency in vitamin C, had
been a problem in the previous camp and
was now present in the new location. A
survey revealed over 40 percent of a
thousand adults and children surveyed
had symptoms of scurvy. Again, MSF
lobbied for improvement to the food
ration and for vitamin C distribution.
Grapefruits were added to the general
food distribution, with some limited
improvement. 
The basic laboratory was able to do
malaria slides and stool examinations. A
nine-year-old chronically ill boy was
discovered to have eggs of
Schistosomiasis mansoni in his stool
sample. The disease had never been
identified before in Somalia, yet several
more cases were identified by the
laboratory.  The findings prompted an
examination of the river running
through the camp for the
intermediate host, a specific type of
snail. MSF-H sent the specimens to
the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, where they
confirmed the snails to be the correct
species for hosting Schistosomiasis. A
total of 86 cases were subsequently
identified and treated in the camp.
The MoH alerted WHO to the finding
to help stop the new disease
spreading to other parts of the
country. 
The objective of starting the
intervention in the new camp was to
hand over all medical activities to the
RHU. In April 1987 this was achieved,
and MSF-H left the camp to take on
support to secondary level medical
services in the nearby centre of Sheik.
It would be MSF's first surgical
programme.  
Source: Project progress reports, Survey
Reports, Medical Reports.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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The desire to professionalise MSF's
medical response started to be discussed
in earnest during the development of the
first strategic planning document, 1987
and beyond. It speaks of the need to
evaluate the medical quality of projects in
terms of effectiveness: namely vaccination
percentage, access to medical services,
medical consumption, mortality and
morbidity numbers, etc.
8 This move
towards being more professional
provoked a debate in the organisation
from those who felt that it clashed with
the volunteer spirit of the organisation.
Up to that point, expatriates had been
recruited through word of mouth, had no
formal entry criteria to meet, and did not
receive any preparation or training.
Improving the quality of the staff was felt
necessary for increasing professionalism,
which would necessitate bringing in
salaries that were in line with the Dutch
labour market. The decision was made to
move away from the 100 percent
voluntary nature of the organisation and
pay salaries to coordinators. And in 1988
the decision was taken to replace the
voluntary medical working group with a
medical department in order to ensure a
higher quality of technical support. 
Moving towards
professionalism and
standardisation
The new Medical Scientific Department
consisted of a medical doctor, a
temporary assistant and a librarian. The
primary tasks as set out in the 1989
annual plan were to design and organise
a new training scheme for volunteers
going on their first mission, to provide
substantive support to the north Darfur
rehabilitation project, to advise other
projects, and to manage professional
contacts.
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The Health Emergency Preparation
course, or HEP course as it came to be
called, was delivered to all first-mission
medical staff. It covered topics such as the
use of oral rehydration solution, how to
implement a disease surveillance system
and how to respond to disease outbreaks.
It also included sessions on how to
change a tyre, supervise staff in a cross-
cultural environment and cope with
conflict within the team. The inevitable
scenarios presented under the topic of
working as a team were the effects on
team dynamics of a romantic liaison
between the logistician and the driver,
and what to do when a team member
brings home prostitutes. 
The course was the first of many
developed by MSF-H, first by the Medical
Scientific Department and later by the
new training unit. Early courses were on
nutrition, vaccination and management.
As the medical programmes become
more complex, the range of courses
expanded. Many were intersectional, but
MSF-H made an early investment in
developing courses and technical
trainings. 
Kala azar
In 1988, the MSF team in Sudan found
itself responding to an outbreak of an
unknown disease. The first patients were
seen in a camp for displaced southern
Sudanese outside Khartoum. Symptoms
were fever, extreme weight loss, anaemia
and enlarged glands. The standard
treatment MSF was providing was not
working. One of the doctors realised that
they were dealing with kala azar (visceral
leishmaniasis). This was the beginning of
MSF-H's commitment to controlling and
treating kala azar. The patients in
Khartoum had travelled miles from West
Upper Nile region, where a devastating
outbreak of this parasitic disease,
transmitted by sand flies, was decimating
the population. MSF-H was working in Ler,
West Upper Nile, and soon realised that it
too was seeing signs of this deadly disease. 
“New patients are coming in daily: hobbling
with a stick or carried by relatives on an
improvised stretcher. Some had to walk for
days, trudging through mud or wading
through rivers. Severely malnourished, often
reduced to mere skin and bones.. they are
first given injection therapy, lasting 30 days
or longer. Imagine daily getting a painful
injection and having to swallow flagyl pills,
which give you nausea and you understand
that a discouragingly high percentage (20
percent) of the patients don't survive. On
the other hand this leaves 80 percent who
wouldn't have otherwise survived…”
8 “1987 en verder…” Beleidsnota mei 1987. Artsen zonder Grenzen. p.9.
9 Annual Plan 1989
10 Seaman J, Mercer AJ, Sondorp E. The epidemic of visceral leishmaniasis in West Upper Nile, southern Sudan: course and impact from 1984 to
1994. Int J Epidem 1996; 25(4): 862-871.
11 Griekspoor A, Sondorp H, Vos T. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Humanitarian Relief Interventions: Visceral Leishmaniasis Treatment in the Sudan.
Health Policy & Pl 1999; 14(1): 70-6.
Excerpt from a letter, Mieke Knoppers
quoted in Haan, A. Lute, E, & Bender, R.
(1994) Médecins Sans Frontières. 10 years
Emergency Aid Worldwide, p. 86
The initial challenges of responding to
kala azar in south Sudan were linked to
security and logistics issues. The
Khartoum government banned aid
agencies in the south of the country, and
MSF-H was one of the very few agencies
working in true 'sans frontières' fashion.
Access was by chartered plane, which
flew into south Sudan illegally to
transport personnel and drugs. When the
outbreak first hit, the teams on the
ground thought that it was typhoid and
flew out blood samples for Widal testing.
The plane with the samples did not make
it back to Kenya. Months later the
wreckage of the plane and the body of
the pilot were found. When the outbreak
was finally confirmed as kala azar, the
teams responded by flying in the
expensive drugs to treat the disease that
otherwise had almost a 100 percent
mortality rate. 
Realising that kala azar was the main
health threat to people living in the
region of West Upper Nile, MSF scaled up
its clandestine interventions. Teams
travelled on foot to the remote villages,
often setting up a clinic under a tree. 
Starting in 1991, workshops were
organised with international experts to
share experience and develop a research
agenda. As MSF gained recognition
externally with WHO/UNICEF for its work
with kala azar, it was decided to risk a
public statement. The Sudanese
government did not retaliate and, from
then on, the response to the epidemic in
the south was done openly. Between
1989 and 1995, 19,000 patients were
treated as part of the response to the
outbreak in south Sudan
10. Sadly, those
treated represented only a fraction of
those infected with the disease, as the
population was not immune to kala azar.
An MSF mortality survey suggested that
since the start of the outbreak in 1984, an
estimated 38-57 percent of the
population had died. In absolute figures
this represented approximately 100,000
people
11.  25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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The neglected nature of the disease, the
fact that it attacked a population affected
by years of war and which was
geographically isolated, the long painful
and expensive treatment regimens and
the difficulty diagnosing the disease all
called for a major engagement by MSF. It
would not work to wait for big pharma or
Western experts to do this work - if MSF
wanted to see the care of their patients
improved, they would have to do it
themselves. In the early days, any
research was frowned upon and felt not
to be MSF. The medical teams persisted,
however, and now more than 40
publications have been written on kala
azar, the majority in peer reviewed
publications. This body of work includes
major innovations on diagnostics that
allow for screening large numbers of
patients and avoiding invasive
The Medical Scientific Department
was created in 1988. The early team
was made up of just one doctor, an
assistant and a part-time librarian.
Shortly after, a part-time training
position was opened to develop the
HEP course for new medical recruits. 
The 'scientific' label had dropped off
by 1991, leaving it as the Medical
Department. Each individual medical
scientific advisor, the precursor to the
health advisor, had a topic area they
supported, such as malaria,
anthropology or surgery. The first
specialist position was a nutritionist in
1991, followed by a mental health
specialist in 1997.  Gradually other
specialists joined including an HIV
advisor, lab specialists,
epidemiologists, etc. 
The first pharmacist started in a
position called 'medical logistics' in
1994. His role was to ensure the
quality of pharmaceutical, food and
laboratory items supplied and used in
the field. During the period of large-
scale drug distribution programmes
in the 1990s, the position was
Evolution of the Medical Scientific Department
supplemented with an additional
pharmacist. The medical logistics position
was later phased out and replaced by a
full-time pharmacist. 
Water and sanitation was considered a
key pillar of the emergency public health
(EPH) response. The first position was
opened in 1989, and supported both
watsan and construction while based in
the Logistics Department. Relative to
other specialist advisor positions, the
number of watsan positions grew quickly.
In 1998, the 3 person unit joined the
Medical Department. The controversial
move reflected recognition that watsan
programming was a public health
intervention and not merely a technical
subject. It was not until 2008 that field
responsibilities shifted to mirror the
departmental logic, where the MedCo
assumes responsibility for watsan
programming from the LogCo. 
The Humanitarian Affairs Department also
merged with the Medical Department in
1998. The new department - composed
of the Medical Department, Humanitarian
Affairs Department and the Watsan Unit -
was renamed the Public Health
Department (PHD). 
The PHD grew to include positions
based in other sections in response to
the move towards sharing operations
amongst the four sections making up
the Amsterdam group. The ambition
was to bring the delegate offices -
which were responsible for recruitment,
fundraising and communications -
closer to the field operations. One
means of doing this was to put medical
expertise in the section. The Manson
Unit in the UK was created to
implement new treatments for
emerging and re-emerging diseases.
The first focus was on malaria and ACT.
The Canadian office, over time,
attempted to put medical advisors in
Canada, notably an HIV advisor
previously working in Amsterdam.
Another model of sharing operations
was to move one of the operational
cells from Amsterdam to the partner
sections. Berlin was the first section to
do this, followed by Toronto. This led to
health advisors being based in Germany
and Canada.  Currently the PHD with
the Manson Unit has over 30 staff
spread over four countries. 
parasitological tests, as well as support for
decentralising services to the peripheral
level. Vector control trials demonstrated
the feasibility of mass distribution of
insecticide-treated bed nets to control
outbreaks of disease. A clinical trial
addressed the safety and efficacy of the
generic formulation of the antimonial
drug used to treat kala azar in East Africa,
allowing huge improvements to the
affordability of treatment in East Africa.
Improvements in treatment regimens
trialled included the use of combination
therapy to decrease mortality and shorten
treatment courses. New drugs were
successfully evaluated for use in severe
and complicated kala azar. Finally a body
of work advanced the knowledge and
treatment protocols for patients co-
infected with both kala azar and HIV.  
MSF in the 1990s:
emergency public health
The ABC discussions
The external environment changed
radically in 1989 with the end of the Cold
War. The nature of conflicts shifted to
more internal civil wars, and humanitarian
action became more complex to
negotiate.  The early 1990s saw
unprecedented organisational growth
linked to the increased demand for MSF-
H to intervene in emergency situations in
the post-Cold War environment. The
demands placed on the organisation to
respond and manage this increased
portfolio of projects, and concerns about
the quality of projects, led to what
became known as the 'ABC discussions'. 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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The 'ABC discussions' were essentially a
typology of projects. 'A' projects were
acute crisis situations including disasters,
acute conflict and refugee movements.
The time-frame for A projects was a
maximum of three months. 'B' projects
were chronically unstable areas that could
lead to a maximum 18-month
intervention. 'C' projects were
development. In May 1991, there was a
decision to focus exclusively on A and B
projects and scrap C projects altogether. 
These longer term structural and
rehabilitation projects were seen as
demanding a different type of expertise,
on a different timeline, that distracted the
organisation's attention from high-priority
emergency assistance and confused the
public's image of MSF. To take over the
abandoned C projects, it was decided to
create a new organisation, HealthNet
International, to handle MSF projects as
they passed from the emergency into the
transition phase. 
The ABC discussions and decisions
resulted in a strong focus for MSF in the
coming years on emergency medical
assistance. From the point of view of the
other MSF sections, it was often seen as
too rigid a focus. However it did give a
clear direction to the organisation, and
allowed the still fledgling Medical
Department to give priority to emergency
assistance over the more complex, longer
term C projects. 
Emergency public health
The strategy document MSF Holland in the
1990s: Decisiveness, Involvement and
Independence, written in 1993, mentions
for the first time the concept of
emergency public health (EPH). It was the
logical extension of the ABC discussions
and the prior choice for the speciality of
medical aid. In the strategic document,
EPH is defined as one of three core
competencies of MSF-H, together with
logistical decisiveness and deployment of
flexible, sufficient and committed staff. In
the years following the strategy
document, the Medical Department
worked on further developing the
concept of EPH.  A 1995 document
12
describes the core concept: 
In contexts of socio-political instability or
reduced health infrastructure delivery
capacity, EPH activity offers a targeted
health intervention focused on risk reduction
in acutely vulnerable populations, with a
view to bridging public health and health
service capacity for that population. This
concept includes access to a population or
population access to health care, health
services to a population, and advocacy for a
population at risk. 
The key difference with public health is
the context. The focus is on the urgency,
scale and priority of health needs by
vulnerable groups. The intervention is
aimed at ensuring that basic human
needs (water, sanitation, shelter, food,
curative and preventative medical care,
and safety and security) are met.
Effectiveness is to be evaluated by
reduced morbidity and mortality instead
of cost and other measures used to
evaluate usual public health interventions.
"It is not different from public health; it
derives from it. What is different is the
context in which public health principles
and practices are applied."
13
"EPH is kind of paradoxical in that we use
public health strategies designed for stable
environments over the long term for
unstable environments over the short term.
Another dimension is that we use these
public health strategies in combination with
curative services. We need to do this
maximise impact."
14
The EPH concept was influential in the
period from 1993 to 2002. The primary
emphasis - on context and only secondly
on health needs - is one that continues to
distinguish MSF-H from other sections.
The rationale is on giving priority to the
higher degree of suffering which comes
12 Orbinski J. Emergency Public Health: An internal Qualitative Survey. Summer 1995; p. 3.
13 Ibid. p9
14 Ibid. p9
15 Ibid. p11
16 Ibid. p10
17 Ibid. p12
from a deliberate attack on a population
in the context of war or deliberate
exclusion which overlaps with the health
needs created. 
"Epidemic or pandemic disease in the
context of social instability or complex
humanitarian disasters is an EPH priority.
We need to think about diseases like
diphtheria, TB, AIDS, malaria and others in
terms of their context. If that context causes
an increase in incidence or prevalence, then
they become EPH priorities."
15
The choice of a target population is
identified by their specific vulnerabilities
as shaped by the context:
"An emergency is not necessarily a random
event, but its effects are targeted to the
most vulnerable, or create vulnerable
groups. We need to ensure that our EPH
interventions recognise the causes of
vulnerability as well as the effects."
16
The public health focus ensured that
prevention and curative care were part of
the response, and effect was measured as
impact on overall mortality and morbidity
of the population rather than the impact
on individual patients. Implicit in the EPH
strategy in the mid-1990s was the limit
placed on the level and standard of care
to the individual: 
"When the health level of a vulnerable
group matches surrounding levels, that is
when we stop adding more resources."
17
This is not to suggest that the quality of
intervention is not important in EPH, as
specific tools and a focus on evaluation
were considered part of the package.
However, it does implicitly accept the
double standard of quality of care
between the rich and poor countries - a
double standard that in less than ten
years would be a rallying call to change
how malaria was treated, and to
introduce antiretroviral therapy (ART)
when the norm in AIDS programmes was
condom distribution and palliative care.  25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
12
A new challenge for the Medical
Department - due both to the changing
geo-political balance as well as the ten-
year-old organisation's potential for
growth - was responding to large scale
emergencies. The goal was to achieve
quantity and, at the same time, high
quality interventions all within a modest
budget. Performing comprehensive
assessments before interventions and
having pre-packaged intervention models
ready were critical to success for this new
challenge.
A major achievement linked to this quest
for high quality, high volume medical aid
was the development of the medical kits
for teams faced with a cholera outbreak.
They could order from headquarters an
off-the-shelf kit that included everything
from chlorine to Ringer's lactate to rubber
boots for the staff. In addition, manuals
started to be written. One of the most
important of these was the Refugee
Health Manual. This pulled together the
accumulated operational experience of
MSF in one guideline, and famously
defined the top ten priorities for refugee
healthcare. It was published externally,
and became widely used by both MSF
and other humanitarian groups. It
continues to be used widely today. The
manual also represented the first real
collaboration between the three large
MSF sections. Where collaboration on an
operational level was often difficult, the
Medical Departments were able to work
together positively and produce a truly
joint project. 
Non-medical props
Medical activities
Water & sanitation                 
From: "MSF in the 1990s: Decisiveness,
involvement and independence". Policy
Memorandum, MSF-Holland, 1993.
Nutrition and water & sanitation (watsan)
are described as the pillars of medical
activities in large scale disasters. Watsan
was becoming increasingly important due
to the inability of many traditional watsan
NGOs to work in unstable contexts. The
1993 policy recommended a 'more
prominent' position in MSF-H for these
activities. Ten months later, MSF found
itself responding to the world's largest
refugee influx as the Rwandan genocide
ended and refugees poured over the
borders to Tanzania and Zaire. In the
resulting cholera outbreak in Zaire, MSF
responded with its biggest water trucking
project in history, supplying two million
litres of clean water a day to the camps
18.
In the same year, but a continent away,
the watsan team installed 16 km of
pipeline in order to ensure water supply
to the Sharsahid camp in Jalabad,
Afghanistan
19. It was and remains the
largest infrastructure project constructed
by MSF-H. 
Nutrition, though not seen as medical,
had always been a large part of MSF-H's
response. Initial activities were selective
feeding programmes for the moderately
and severely malnourished. Learning was
very much by doing, and this
accumulated experience was distilled into
MSF's Nutritional Guidelines, published in
1994. They were used extensively in the
field and were adopted by many
organisations looking for practical advice.
Gone were the days of each project
inventing its own recipes for therapeutic
milk. 
Having developed protocols for the
treatment of malnutrition, the
organisation struggled with the dilemma
of prevention. As with watsan, the
organisations responsible for the large
scale general food distribution
programmes - which were essential for
keeping refugees and IDPs alive - were
often not up to the job in unstable
settings. This was having a significant
negative impact on MSF's medical and
nutritional programming. MSF-H did not
feel that it had the expertise to perform
these distributions itself, nor did it relish
the idea of becoming a sub-contractor for
the World Food Programme (WFP). For a
time, the possibility of setting up a
separate organisation for general food
distribution was considered. MSF-France
was already moving in this direction and
had set up a new Food Aid Department.
In the end, MSF-H decided against this
route. Instead, a classification system for
nutritional situational analysis was
developed, which signalled when
interventions were needed. This system
was later taken up by the WFP and
adapted for wider use. MSF-H
concentrated on lobbying other actors for
food aid using the classification system to
signal alerts. Only when the lobby failed
would MSF-H reluctantly consider doing
general food distributions.  
Mental health
In the late 1980s, the psychological
impact of the experiences of field staff
started to be recognised. In 1989 contact
was made with the Dutch Institute for
Psychotrauma to see what role MSF could
play in supporting the mental health of
staff and returned volunteers. A number
of recommendations were made and,
18 Op Cit. de Haan. p103
19 MSF Operational Memory Project. Afghanistan and Pakistan. 1979-2005. p30.
Nutrition
“In Baghdad I was taken hostage with two other female team members. We were in
Baghdad for a meeting and [our cab] somehow ended up in the Shiite district. We
were suddenly set upon and pushed into the back seat. The attackers then got into the
cab themselves, ordering the chauffeur to drive away. The chauffeur translated for us
that they wanted to rape the women and kill us. We entered the desert and, after
driving around for two hours, we entered Baghdad and were released. At the time, no
psychological support was provided after an experience like this; there was no
emotional debriefing. I was very confused by this incident. Months later I still couldn't
talk about it. I also wasn't sure whether this kind of thing could be talked about at the
office at all.”
First time mission volunteer 1991. In: Haan, A. Lute, E, & Bender, R. (1994)
Médecins sans Frontières. 10 years Emergency Aid Worldwide, p. 59.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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despite resistance, the culture slowly
started to change to make emotional
support of staff less of a taboo. 
Information on stress reactions was
included in trainings, while teams from
the Dutch Institute for Psychotrauma
started to provide direct support to teams
who had undergone traumatic
experiences. By 1992 a psychologist
worked in the office to brief and de-brief
expats
20 and, one year later, a peer
support network was started. 
The recognition of the emotional effects
of trauma on MSF staff prompted an
awareness of the mental health
consequences of trauma for the
populations helped by MSF.  In 1990,
MSF-H entered the Gaza Strip in order to
establish a strategic presence in the Arab
world and, during the exploratory
mission, contact was made with a
Palestinian psychiatrist, who needed
support running a community-based
mental health programme to help
Palestinians cope with the mental trauma
of the intifada. MSF sent several
psychiatrists out to help support training
and also supported an occupational
therapy programme.  The project was not
a runaway success due to challenges
working with the local partners, but it did
meet many of its objectives. In HQ it
received little attention and was
eventually handed over in 1995.
21
Nevertheless, on the basis of the Gaza
programme and the experience of
returning expatriates, one of the board
members put forward mental health as a
new programme area.  The reasoning was
that if expatriates could become so
distressed by what they had seen and
experienced, the refugees must be in
much worse shape.  
In 1993, an appeal came from the
psychiatric department of the Kosovo
Hospital in Sarajevo. The staff were
overwhelmed with the caseload and
requested help. A programme to provide
psychotherapy by lay counsellors was
important that, first of all, it was shown to
be safe and not harmful, and secondly to
show the efficacy of the intervention. 
Fifteen years later, despite the explosion
of popularity of mental health
programming in emergency aid, there are
few reports on outcomes of mental health
interventions in the literature. 
Within MSF, the results of the Bosnian
mission were influential in formulating the
intervention approach for future mental
health programmes. The ability to
measure the results was also important in
helping build scientific credibility for an
area that for a long time was seen as soft. 
The focus for MSF-H's future mental
health programmes was determined to be
trauma, in line with the strategic choice
to focus operations in conflict and post-
conflict areas. The initial policy paper,
developed in 1998, defined the target
population of mental health interventions
as primarily the 20 percent of the
population affected by post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and secondarily the
80 percent of the population suffering
from 'traumatic stress' and therefore at
risk of developing the pathology
23. In
time, the ambitions were scaled down to
the more realistic objectives of relieving
symptoms and improving day-to-day
functioning. 
20 (Summary) Medium-Term Policy Plan MSF Holland (January 1994)
21 Timmermans N. Internal Evaluation of MSF-Holland projects in the Gaza Strip, Occupied Palestinian Territories June 1990 - January 1995.
22 Mooren TTM, et al. The impact of a mental health programme in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Effects on coping and general health. Journal of Clinical
Psychology 2003; 59: 1-13.
23 De Jong K. Mental Health Policy 1998.
developed. The overall objective was to
provide support for those suffering war-
related mental health trauma and to
prevent severe psychopathology.
Treatment was based on principles
derived from brief trauma-focused
therapy (Brom, Kleber & Defares, 1989;
Foa, Hearst-Ikeda & Perry, 1995). 
Counsellors came from a variety of
professional backgrounds and were
trained for three months by a team from
Amsterdam. Through collaboration with
Utrecht University, a database was created
to track and monitor the clients of the
programme. The efficacy of the
interventions was monitored through
application of standard psychological
instruments
22 at the start of intervention
and on the final visit. The results were
published in 2003.  In terms of subjective
general health status, 67 percent had
either improvement or complete recovery,
whereas in the domain of coping with
traumatic experiences, only 38 percent
either improved or recovered. Fewer than
10 percent experienced worsening of
symptoms in both areas. These results are
described by the authors of the paper as
'modest'. What is notable, however, is
that the intervention model of the first
mental health programme was so well
monitored and documented. Given the
newness of the programme, it was
Objectives 
The objectives of MSF mental health programmes are: 
1. To give appropriate support/treatment to people suffering from PTSD; 
2. To prevent PTSD and more severe psychopathology in the group that suffers
from traumatic stress, through the support of the normal coping process; 
3. To avoid unnecessary medicalisation of traumatic stress and PTSD-related
problems by offering adequate information (psychoeducation), initiating self-
help mechanisms in the community and support/treatment;  
4. To promote the rights of, to create awareness of and to bear witness to those
traumatised by violence. 
Excerpt from the MSF-H Mental Health Policy 199825 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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The 1996 mid-term plan stated the
ambition of MSF-H to become a leading
expert in mental health care.
Commitment was one thing, but actually
opening projects was another. Uptake in
operations of mental health programmes
was not easy. In 1999, external evaluators
assessed the barriers to implementation
and recommended several options,
including abandoning mental health and
psychosocial programming altogether
24.
The management team decided to go with
the option of integrating mental health
into regular MSF programmes. Mental
health thus became part of a trio of 'non-
medical' interventions associated with EPH,
together with watsan and nutrition. 
MSF sans médecins? 
The focus on emergency public health,
with curative care on the side, impacted
on the profile of staff sent to the field.
Most doctors and nurses recruited in the
1990s for MSF-H were told not to expect
to lay hands on patients. Clinical care was
to be done by national staff or Ministry of
Health (MoH) partners. The expat's role
was to put the intervention in place, and
train and clinically supervise the national
medical staff. The few 'lucky' ones who
ended up doing clinical work were
surgeons and those in the first-tier
response to emergency outbreaks. The
overall number of doctors and
paramedical
25 staff in the organisation
dipped from a high of 79 percent in 1985
to an average of 36 percent between
1992 and 1999(see annex 5).  This
affected not just the composition of
medical staff in projects, but also the
number of medical and paramedical
people in field coordinating positions. 
The 1994 PHD AP notes: 
"In 1993 it became clear that the medical
department-medical coordinator axis is
becoming crucial in improving the quality of
programmes, given the situation that more
and more country and project managers do
not have a medical background."
26
The decline in medical people in the
organisation was not just in the field.
Previously, operations - responsible for
line managing all the field missions and
taking the decisions on programmes -
were medical doctors. This started to shift
in the mid-1990s, when it became less
common for those making decisions to
have a medical background. There is no
evidence that this was an intentional shift,
and the board at times emphasised the
need for medical people in the positions
of management. It is likely that the shift
came about simply due to the
proportional shift of medical to non-
medical people in the field. A deliberate
change was to remove the head of the
Medical Department from the
Management Team in 1993.  It came as
part of an organisational re-structuring
that aimed to improve decisiveness and
flexibility now that the focus following the
ABC discussions was so strongly on
emergency aid.  With few medical
operational managers and no formal
medical voice in the management team,
MSF-H earned notoriety as the section
without medical people in decision-
making positions. 
Responding in Europe: Bosnia
The post-Cold War context alerted the
organisation to the need to find ways to
respond to crises in Eastern Europe. It
would quickly be put to the test in
Yugoslavia. MSF-H made a strategic
decision to intervene in the region in
1991 before full-scale war in the region
broke out. The first intervention was to
work with the other sections to assist in
evacuating wounded from Vukovar when
it fell in 1991. The evacuation was
dangerous, and three MSF expats were
injured when a convoy hit a land mine.
Immediately afterwards, the intervention
moved to Bosnia. The pre-war assessment
had predicted that the key needs would
be drug supply rather than medical staff.
In the early days of the war, MSF was the
only major international NGO present in
Sarajevo. On the day the siege started,
MSF-H received its second shipment of
drugs and supplies. These supplies proved
critical to keeping the health system in
Sarajevo partially functioning during the
long months of siege. 
Bosnia proved to be MSF-H's largest
programme ever in terms of both expats
and money. In 1992 and 1993, the mission
accounted for 25 percent of the overall
operational budget, and 11 percent of
expats. The main activity over the period
of the mission from 1991 to 1997
continued to be drug distribution. Drugs,
medical materials and logistical materials
(including coal for psychiatric institutes)
were supplied to hospitals and health
centres on all sides of the various
frontlines. Insulin supply programmes kept
diabetics alive and, in a separate project,
cyclophosphamide was procured for renal
transplant patients who needed to
continue on their immunosuppressant. The
distribution programme started to be seen
as being "out of control" and was criticised
for being in contradiction to the medical
identity of MSF, as it lacked proximity to
the patients. To answer this, an evaluation
was done in 1995 which concluded that
the growth could be attributed to three
aspects: needs, internal factors and
availability of funds. In the early period,
there was a clear justification in terms of
needs. The strategy to meet these needs
contributed to the growth of the project.
There was a strong desire to reach the
most isolated and vulnerable communities
and, to ensure neutrality, to work on all
sides of the conflict. The result was to
target all of Bosnia that was accessible, and
this resulted in providing support to health
systems covering a population of
2,417,000. This wide geographic coverage
provided access to a huge amount of
information which was highly respected by
other actors
27, and with that respect came
a certain amount of influence.  
In 1993, the medical officer in the
Bosnian city of Tuzla recognised that a
number of trauma patients had
dysfunctional limbs due to a disruption of
peripheral nerves. Although some could
receive treatment in Tuzla itself, others
were being evacuated out of the country
for surgery. Meanwhile, there was
pressure from HQs to 'do something
medical', and the Medical Department
was especially keen on the surgery idea.
Externally, there was intense media hype
around airlifts of individual patients for
specialised care in outside countries. MSF
opposed the airlifts of individual patients
and felt that resources should instead be
directed toward providing care in-
country. Thus the specialist surgery
programme was born. 
24 A Study of the Operational Constraints and Opportunities for Mental Health Programmes within MSF-H. Queen Margaret University College,
Edinburgh. March 1999.
25 Paramedical is used within MSF to refer to all non-physician health staff. It includes, among others, nurses, midwives, nutritionists, mental health
workers, epidemiologists, laboratory technicians and pharmacists.
26 Annual Plan 1994, p. 36
27 Veeken H, Meijman B. An internal evaluation of the MSF distribution/ monitoring project in Bosnia (period Sept 1991- Sept 1994).  January 1995.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
15
Five teams of plastic surgeons and
anaesthetic nurses performed 150
microsurgery operations in Tuzla in 1993-
94. An orthopaedic team did a rotation
but was not so successful. In Sarajevo,
plastic surgery teams rotated throughout
central Bosnia, and trauma surgeons
worked on a rotating basis in war
hospitals. The trauma surgery idea was
quickly abandoned because the surgeons
found their Bosnian colleagues were often
not receptive to their assistance.  It was
also very complicated to prepare the visits
due to the insecure areas they were
working in. 
The plastic surgery programme was
successful in the sense that it provided
highly specialised care to a group of
patients with significant functional
impairment. The numbers treated were
small, but there was a morale-boosting
impact for the population. However, in
the office people remembered mostly the
huge logistical effort to implement the
programme, and the challenges of
dealing with so many surgical
personalities. It was ten years before
another specialist surgery intervention
was attempted by MSF-H, this time for
the facial mutilation perpetrated by the
Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.
The Bosnian mission was the first
response to a crisis in Europe. Most
projects up to that point were in sub-
Saharan Africa in settings with weak
health systems. Bosnia required
adaptation, not only in terms of a
massively expanded drug list, but also in
terms of attitude. 
"Imagine yourself in the position of a
Chinese healthcare team coming into YOUR
hospital and demanding to treat YOUR
patients. The chances are 99.9 percent that
you would kindly tell them to bugger off
and get the hell out!"
28
Despite the development of the
Yugoslavian health system, there were
gaps. Rational drug use was not
understood, and prescribing habits were
driven very much by demand. MSF did
little to address the gap. Training was a
minor part of the distribution programme
and even in the surgery programme,
there was a hesitancy to impose
knowledge or improved techniques on
the Bosnian doctors. This is illustrated
rather starkly in the awkwardly worded
job profile for the expat trauma surgeons: 
Follows up, as much as possible, the
treatment protocols established by the
surgical units of the hospitals, unless ethical
considerations unable to do it. In such a
circumstance, avoiding controversy by
transferring the patient to local colleges is
advised.
29
Even more fundamental than how to
intervene in settings with functioning
health systems, what Bosnia and other
missions in Eastern Europe illustrated were
the challenges to find relevant medical
interventions in these settings. While the
contexts fitted with the organisational
priorities, often it was difficult to identify
needs that MSF-H could address. The
imbalance risked leading to projects that
had little impact on the health needs of
28 Kiseljak quotes
29 War Surgeon/Surgical Support Programme to War Hospitals. Job Description. 
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Yugoslavia and Rwandan crisis, resulted in
an increased emphasis within MSF on the
dual role of medical staff as healer and as
witness. In 1995, an intersectional
meeting in Chantilly added témoignage
and advocacy to the organisation's
informal mandate. Despite the initial
reluctance and internal debates about
sacrificing neutrality, there was now a
clear sense of duty and a priority within
the Dutch section on witnessing and
advocacy. In practice, this was done
mostly through passing on information to
other actors and direct lobbying with
stakeholders, the so-called 'silent
diplomacy' route. However, MSF was now
increasingly speaking out in its own
name. 
The mid-term plan (MTP) of the late
1990s identified the integration of
témoignage into MSF's activities as a shift
of policy. The humanitarian affairs unit,
which had started in 1992 with the hiring
of one lawyer to address legal issues
linked to International Humanitarian Law,
was now an established unit working on
humanitarian advocacy. It joined the
Medical Department and Watsan Unit in
1998, prompting the name change to the
Public Health Department. The merger of
units acknowledged the connection
between public health and advocacy,
something that was not necessarily
obvious to all in the organisation. The
links between health and human rights
were actively explored and used as a
framework both for intervention criteria
but also for targeting of some medical
programmes. When MSF's role for
humanitarian advocacy conflicted with
the possibility for presence, there was
always a difficult debate. How to weigh
the ethical balance between responding
to medical needs versus the moral
obligation to denounce unacceptable
violations of human rights? How to
respond if there is suspicion that MSF's
medical action is actively fuelling the
conflict? How is the obligation towards
immediate patient needs weighed against
the obligation to do no harm? These
debates flared around specific events,
such as the famous decision to withdraw
from the Zairian refugee camps after it
became clear that humanitarian assistance
was being actively diverted by the
genocidaire leaders in the camps. MSF-H
did not take this decision immediately,
and only did so after all advocacy avenues
had been exhausted, nine months after
the French section had pulled out.  
Crucially, the decision to withdraw was
possible because the mortality rates were
under control and there was no longer a
major health emergency. 
'Demand driven'
The growth of MSF-H in the mid-1990s
led to the conclusion that headquarters
had grown too large and the organisation
was at risk of becoming bureaucratic and
losing its focus on populations in
danger
30.  Many felt that the organisation
had gone from a 'pioneering' or
entrepreneurial organisation to a highly
structured, bureaucratic one that had lost
some of its reactivity. The proposed
solution was to become a demand driven
organisation. 
Demand driven (DD) was a concept
developed by management theorists in
the mid-1990s for business. The principle
was that businesses should entirely orient
themselves around the client rather than
around its own bureaucratic needs. To do
this, the company needed to identify its
primary processes or core business. The
managers in charge of the primary
process should be responsible for both
resources and output
31.  MSF-H identified
its primary processes as medical
emergency aid, advocacy, the use of
volunteers, and fundraising. All activities
should be focused on these core
processes.  
A new organisational structure was
devised to accommodate the new DD
structure and implemented in 1997.
Operational Directors (OD) would be in
charge of the primary processes: both the
resources (ie support departments) and
operations. Together with the general
director, they would form the
management team. Decision-making was
pushed down to the field, to the country
manager, who replaced the programme
managers or desks sitting in Amsterdam.
The country management team (CMT)
became responsible for all the operational
decisions, keeping the decision-making
close to the 'client'. They in turn
delegated tasks to headquarters. The OD's
main role was ensuring compliance with
policy. The role of the MedCo was re-
30 Demand Driven MSF-Holland: A very brief overview. 1997
31 O'Malley S. Demand Driven Evaluation. 2000; p11.
the population, while, from an
operational perspective, they were in
places where MSF clearly needed to be
present. This dilemma of a mismatch
between context and medical needs
continues to challenge MSF-OCA today.
Genocide, refugees and cholera
On 6 April 1994, the genocide in Rwanda
exploded. MSF-H teams reduced
dramatically in number as many members
of the international staff were evacuated.
A small team attempted to provide
surgery in Kigali, together with the Red
Cross, despite the impossible conditions.
In the following months, MSF struggled
to respond on the ground while publicly
advocating for an international military
intervention to stop the genocide. 
In July, when the refugees starting
pouring over the Gisenyi border into
Goma, in what was then Zaire, at a
reported rate of 15,000 per hour, it was
like nothing that anyone had seen before.
MSF-H was well positioned to respond, as
a regular project was already present and
emergency stocks were on the ground.
However, the scale of the crisis was much
larger than ever had been imagined. 
Within days, cholera struck. The major
difficulty in reaching the refugee camps
was that the roads were blocked with
people and corpses clogging the roads.
MSF-H chartered a helicopter to get the
team and supplies up the 50-km-long
stretch of road. Dumper trucks carted out
dead bodies from the camps, while
journalists stood amid the chaos and
applied make-up ready for their on-
camera spot. Staff and Ringer's Lactate
poured into the country. All five MSF
sections worked full out to contain the
cholera, the dysentery, and eventually the
meningitis that followed. Surgical services,
inpatient care and nutritional centres
were quickly set up. Mental health
programmes were added when teams in
the clinics reported high numbers of
patients presenting with non-specific
physical complaints. 
Témoignage
The post-cold war landscape, and the
increasing tolerance amongst the
international community for human rights
abuses, as exemplified in the former25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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defined to one of functional support, as
the authority lay with the project
coordinator/country manager line. This
line management model effectively cut
out the support departments from
decision-making at HQ level, and at field
level cut out the medical coordinators
(and logistics coordinators) from line
management. There were exceptions,
however, to the DD model. Key aspects of
security and advocacy remained the
responsibility of the OD, and the
emergency support desk and finances
were not part of the DD system
32.  
The shift to field management was
important to ensure flexibility and the
ability to react to events. It put the
decision-making as close as possible to
the populations in need. However, it did
have some negative consequences for
medical programming and medical
ambitions. Relegating the medical
coordinator and health advisor (HA) to
advisory roles relied on the goodwill (or
good sense) of the country manager or
the Operational Director to ensure that
their advice was taken. Many MedCos
and HAs complained of decisions being
taken without proper medical input,
particularly as they related to closing
projects and changing strategy. 
A couple of examples of the demand
driven system having a negative impact
on medical quality and medical
programming are the local purchase of
pharmaceuticals policy, and the issue of
female genital mutilation. 
Local purchase of medical products was
well known to be high risk, and an
international policy existed stating that
the quality control responsible (ie a
pharmacist) must approve all local
purchases. This kind of top-down
approach did not sit well with the
demand driven culture: 
Since the change to a demand driven
system, the policy seems to have become
more a guideline. MT basically... agrees that
a medical coordinator can approve the use
of local pharmaceuticals. Advice: do not
make too many policies, keep the field
responsible and do check the drugs if
necessary (there can never be a 100 percent
guarantee)
33.
The impossibility of a medical coordinator
having the technical expertise to safely
evaluate the quality of a manufacturer
and supplier did not seem to matter. In
the end, the head of the Public Health
Department succeeded in convincing the
MT to overturn the decision months later,
but it is shocking that the MT would
prioritise a management principle over
quality of care to the patient, particularly
on such a technical issue. It is especially
shocking given that there was acceptance
that another highly technical issue -
namely financial control - was explicitly
excluded from the demand driven model.
Similar decisions were made weeks earlier
for the document tabled on female
genital mutilation, setting out MSF's
opposition to it and the refusal to allow
MSF materials or staff to be involved in
the practice, and for a document on
emergency preparedness. After discussion,
the MT decided to make both documents
guidelines rather than policy, with the
reasoning being that fewer policies should
be made by headquarters in the new
demand driven structure
34. 
A demand driven organisation needed a
focus on accountability and reporting, as
well as monitoring and evaluation. MSF as
a 'learning organisation' became a
fashionable catch phrase. As a direct
consequence of the DD changes, the
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was
created in 1997. MSF-H, from its earliest
days, had emphasised the quality of the
intervention and monitoring and
evaluation of interventions. The very first
MSF-H mission in Darfur had an external
evaluation. Now, with an increased need
for accountability in the decentralised
decision-making structure, the evaluation
function became formalised in
headquarters. Over 11 years, the unit
produced 52 evaluations. This was an area
in which MSF-H led in terms of the other
sections, even up to several years ago
35.
Ultimately the DD model was abandoned
in its purest form, and adapted to a more
hybrid system. Line management
remains, however, as do many elements
of the DD model, namely that many
decisions remain decentralised to the
field. 
Tuberculosis 
MSF-H's focus on emergency and short-
term commitment posed a problem for
TB treatment. In the 1990s, WHO did not
recommend treatment of TB in unstable
and emergency settings, yet teams were
encountering patients with TB in the field,
in feeding centres and hospitals, and had
difficulty accepting that they could not
treat them. The fear was that resistance
would develop if patients could not be
guaranteed to complete their treatment:
the potential public health risk trumped
the individual patient risk. But the
pressure from the field teams was to treat,
and eventually they just started to do it. 
"That idea was not yet accepted in the
world of TB experts, which is very
conservative overall. But for us it was clear
that you can treat TB in refugee settings.
We started treating TB in south Sudan:
MSF-H was really a forerunner in that.
There was criticism from other sections, as
well as from other actors. At some point, the
other sections followed, but that was when
WHO was also already changing its
position."
36
One of MSF-H's first programmes to treat
TB in unstable settings was in south
Sudan
37. The regimen introduced was the
Manyatta regimen, which had been used
by the Ministry of Health in Kenya, and
which MSF had experience of in Kakuma
refugee camp. It was adapted to a semi-
nomadic population, using a longer
intensive phase under directly observed
treatment, and was completed by several
months of a continuation phase that
could be done without supervision.
Between 1993 and 1997, 2,500 patients
were treated in West Upper Nile province
by MSF
38. 
32 Ibid.
33 Minutes Management Team Meeting. December 29, 1998.
34 Management Team Minutes. December 1, 1998. 
35 Cabrol, Jean-Clement. Evaluation and MSF. November 2008: p1.
36 Interview Lucie Blok, former Head of Public Health Department
37 Keus K, Houston S, Melaku Y, Burling S. Treatment of a cohort of tuberculosis patients using the Manyatta regimen in a conflict zone in South
Sudan. Trans R Soc Trop Med Hyg; 2003; 97: 614-8.
38 Ellman T. Evaluation of Tuberculosis Treatment in Lankien, South Sudan: The 2001 Pilot Cohort. August 2002. Annex 1. 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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leaving MSF to start their own NGO to
treat TB. In the pilot programme, the
team focused on patient education and
contingency planning, which included a
'runaway bag' of one month's drug supply
in case MSF was forced to evacuate. The
pilot experience showed that the default
rate from the four- month intensive phase
was less than 1 per cent. This experience
was well documented and showed that it
was possible to safely treat TB in conflict
settings despite the constraints
39. 
HIV 
HIV care started to be intensively
discussed in the movement in the 1990s
and many projects started to think about
incorporating AIDS prevention messages
into their programmes. 
"When I was working as the HoM/MedCo in
Uganda, in the early 1990s, we were
already coming across HIV-positive patients
in our project. We organised a regional
meeting with the other sections on
HIV/AIDS in 1991 and decided that we
could no longer ignore the problem. A letter
was issued to all the sections that we had to
respond to HIV/AIDS in some way. Following
that, projects were started up, but only
focusing on prevention and palliative care at
that time. In Uganda, the MSF-H mission in
Soroti started its first HIV project. Then,
projects in Southeast Asia followed.
40" 
The idea of standalone vertical HIV
projects was highly controversial in the
management team. They were considered
'C projects', and thus at odds with MSF-
H's emergency focus. Further, the idea of
doing HIV treatment in developing
countries was seen by outside actors as
unfeasible. But it was not possible simply
to ignore HIV, and gradually more
programming and projects got
acceptance. The 1996 annual plan
mentions that three projects had been
designated as HIV ones: Cuba, Myanmar
and Cambodia. Cambodia had several
projects for HIV, including one addressing
STI/AIDS which started in 1995 "in close
cooperation with brothel owners".  These
projects started to move from STI
treatment to AIDS 'care', which essentially
meant opportunistic infection treatment
and palliation. The next hurdle was
starting antiretroviral therapy (ART). 
Access to Essential Medicines
Campaign
The lack of access in the developing world
to drugs, diagnostics and vaccines was
identified internationally in the late 1990s
as a major issue blocking the ambitions of
the field teams to improve the medical
assistance they were delivering. 
Sometimes it was a question of price, at
other times it was a lack of research and
development - into neglected diseases, for
instance. A good example was the lack of
good treatment for sleeping sickness
(human African trypanosomiasis). In 1999,
MSF's Campaign for Access to Essential
Medicines Campaign (CAME) was
launched by all MSF sections. In MSF-H,
positions were created for campaigners
who sat in the Public Health Department
(PHD) and functioned as the liaison
between the Access Campaign and the
field teams. The early focus was on getting
access to artemisinin combination therapy
(ACT) for malaria and to antiretrovirals for
HIV. Initially the field teams worked very
closely with the Access Campaign, with
more than half of field missions asking for
support on access issues in 2002
41. Later, as
the key drivers that prompted the start of
the Access Campaign were successfully
addressed, requests for field support
dropped and eventually the positions in
the Dutch office stopped.
The decision to start a TB programme should never be taken lightly. The decision
does not only have to take medical aspects into account, but also important
non-medical aspects. 
Three questions always have to be answered first: 
1. Does MSF have the commitment and the resources to continue a TB
programme for a sufficiently long period (at least 12-15 months)? 
2. Is the area or camp, where the TB programme will be implemented expected
to remain stable for at least 12-15 months?
3. Is MSF able to assure a good quality programme, when it runs a TB
programme, alone as the directly implementing agency or in a supporting role,
working with counterparts? 
MSF TB Policy 1995
39 Keus K, Houston S, Melaku Y, et al. Field research in humanitarian medical programmes: Treatment of a cohort of tuberculosis patients using the
"Manyatta" regimen in a conflict zone in South Sudan. Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 2003; 97: 614-618.
40 Interview Lucie Blok, former head of Public Health Department
41 PHD Annual Plan 2003, p1.
It took a lot of pushing from the Medical
Department and field teams in order to
increase the organisation's commitment
to treating TB. The longer-term nature of
treatment went against the emergency
focus of the organisation. Some felt it was
too complex for MSF and that the
expertise was lacking. The pressure from
the medics continued, and slowly it
achieved focus. A platform to discuss and
advance TB was formed with KNCV in the
mid-1990s. Annual plans of the
department continually put TB as a
priority. An intersectional policy for TB
was agreed in 1995. While this was
undoubtedly a step forward, given the
general reluctance to treat TB, the policy
was still remarkably conservative in
defining who should be treated and in
which settings.  The irony was that in
MSF-H's first projects in the 1980's TB was
treated in refugee camps without any
discussion, as a direct response to field
needs. It was when HQ became involved
that treatment stopped. 
Evidence to counter the MSF policy was
collected in south Sudan several years
later in a more insecure context than the
first south Sudan experience. It consisted
of a pilot cohort of 163 patients who
were admitted in Lankien during a time of
active conflict. The programme arose after
much debate in the team about treating
TB - a debate that resulted in some expats25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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Natural Disasters: defining the
limits
The questions raised by the first
interventions in natural disasters
continued. When responding to natural
disasters in countries where MSF was not
already present, the teams were
consistently too late to have a significant
medical impact in the initial phase.
Overall, the medical assistance MSF could
deliver was limited, and while epidemics
were often feared in the aftermath of
natural disasters, experience showed
major disease outbreaks to be a rare
event.  In the late 1990s, evaluations of
the responses were done, and separate
policy papers outlining a limited role for
MSF in natural disasters were defined. The
guidance limited interventions in
countries outside MSF project countries to
extremely large-scale disasters where
MSF-H could reasonably hope to arrive
early enough to fill a gap in the response
of other actors. In countries where MSF
was already working, MSF would plan to
respond as needed. Following this, a
review was done of 21 natural disaster
responses by MSF-H to check the
reliability of the guidance. The analysis
looked at a number of elements of the
response and graded how many of the
interventions met the criteria. The
findings were that 80 percent of the
interventions met criteria for a 'good
enough' intervention including speed of
response, control of epidemics and exit
strategy
42. It recommended retaining the
policy for limited intervention outside
MSF project countries, while at the same
time it encouraged better preparedness in
MSF missions in countries that were
disaster prone. The management team
(MT) used the results of this evaluation to
confirm the guidance as policy. A recent
review of seven natural disaster responses
by MSF-Operational Centre Geneva came
to similar conclusions as those reached by
the MT, which turned out to be
remarkably similar to the opinion of the
board in the 1980s. 
The 2000s: Shifting from
populations to patients
The approach towards programming in
the late 1990s was framed on the
principles of emergency public health
(EPH).  Curative care for the individual
patient was a component of the EPH
approach, but the emphasis was on
impact at the population health level.  In
1998, as the organisation was again
reviewing strategic direction, there was an
explicit debate on this choice: should
MSF-H focus on curative care or public
health? The feedback from the debates
with the field and the association was
split. The Public Health Department
decided to refuse the question: 
Whether we choose a public health
approach (combining curative and
preventive healthcare, water, sanitation,
food and shelter), or a more individual
curative approach, or a combined approach,
will depend on the found needs, priorities
and best way of making a meaningful
difference.
43
The resulting decision on medical
intervention strategies in the mid-term
plan for the new century was a significant
broadening of medical programming: 
We will not limit ourselves as to what kind
of programmes we will do - we will do any
medical programme that is an effective
reaction to the needs created by
humanitarian crisis (including TB or HIV
projects, projects in institutions or in urban
contexts).
44
The analysis was still through an EPH lens,
and the language still talked about
populations in danger, but the next mid-
term plan (2003-2005) would announce
boldly the ambition to refocus on people
and their needs rather than on
populations, diseases or health systems.
This shift from public health towards
curative care, and the introduction of the
word "patients" to the MSF-H lexicon, was
a major turning point. The influences
were varied. The external environment,
with the growing threat from infectious
diseases and resistance, and the switch to
new contexts - away from closed camps
toward open settings, urban
environments and institutions -
demanded a different response. Medical
ethics were more visible in the
organisation, with the focus on putting
the patient at the centre of the individual
doctor's response. Changes within the
movement had an influence as well. The
International Council, the highest
associative body in the international MSF
movement, was continually, and initially
with few visible results, pushing the
medical departments and operations to
respond to the threats caused by resistant
malaria and TB, and to start ART for HIV
patients. The Access Campaign was
moving forward and challenging MSF
medical departments and operations to
keep up. 
The shift in focus came with a new
emphasis on an integrated approach to
the needs of people and an objective to
further develop quality of care.
45
Integrated approach
The emergency public health model had
evolved to one based on a model of an
integrated package of health services.
Here the integration was medical care
together with nutrition, water and
sanitation, and later psychosocial and
mental health programming. The logical
extension of this approach in the public
health programmes was to shift it over to
the new curative focus. This subsequent
choice to focus on people and not on
diseases had major implications for
medical programming. MSF-France was
developing vertical programmes as
'islands of excellence', where a surgical
ward in a district hospital would be fitted
out with the latest equipment, and expat
specialist surgeons would rotate on a
three-week schedule to provide high-level
surgical care. Yet if you were unlucky
enough to have a non-surgical problem,
there was no MSF doctor to help you.
This approach was unpalatable to many
raised in the MSF-H tradition, with its
history of utilitarian ethics and the new
focus on people. The idea that the type of
pathology determined access to
treatment was simply not acceptable; the
ambition instead was to respond to the
major morbidities and mortalities where
MSF worked. Vertical approaches were
42 Doherty P. An Evaluation of MSF-Holland Natural Disaster Response, 1999.
43 Lucie B. Health Trends in a Context of a World of Injustice and Humanitarian Crises. 1998: p9.
44 MSF-Holland Mid-Term Policy 2000-2002, p13.
45 2003 PHD Annual Plan 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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reserved for settings where the other
major health needs were already met,
where MSF needed to invest to learn a
specific approach such as MDR-TB, and
where a single pathology was the
overwhelming need. 
The integrated approach led to the
inclusion of non-communicative chronic
disease treatment in primary and
secondary care programmes. Limits
remain with oncology treatment, where
the only exception where MSF-H offers
treatment is with Kaposi's sarcoma in HIV
programmes. This is an area that will
need to be addressed in the future.
The treatment of psychiatric patients was
introduced, with the same integration
logic, into primary care services. It has
proved difficult to achieve widespread
access to care due to barriers on the part
of individual healthcare workers. Some
physicians and MedCos are not used to
treating psychiatric illness, and have
proved resistant to start, despite efforts to
provide expert support and guidelines.
Where physicians have adopted the
simple treatment measures needed to
treat acute psychosis, for example, the
treatment has been transformative for
patients and their families.
The choice of integrated health
programmes as the default option has
had consequences. Often it means that
the standard of care does not achieve
what is possible in a vertical programme.
It puts a high burden on medical staff to
be generalists, to work further outside
their comfort zone and - in particular for
medical coordinators, who are
increasingly non-physicians - to manage
highly complex and diverse medical
programmes. Integration demands easily
accessible tools and guidelines for the
field. One of the lessons learned through
the implementation of HIV integration is
the value of expert implementers who can
go in, assist the teams to start the new
activity - whether it be reproductive
health or HIV care - and then hand over a
programme which is up and running.
Integration has demanded simplification
and new models of care delivery. 
Quality of care
The term 'basic healthcare' carries an
intrinsic risk of acceptance of sub-standard
levels of care as the ultimate to be provided
in crisis situations. We have not only
accepted to work with ineffective protocols,
such as prescribed by MoHs in different
countries, we have also followed WHO
doctrines and developmentalist rhetoric on
sustainability as a pre-condition for
interventions such as TB treatment and
AIDS care. During the past few years we
have, however, started to challenge these
axioms... Still it is not realistic to expect to
be able to provide the European standard of
care in all situations. Anti-epileptic
treatment without a fair chance of
uninterrupted treatment would be mal-
treatment, while starting TB treatment
without proper follow-up would be
unethical.
46
Quality is a persistent theme in MSF-H
strategic documents dating back to the
late 1980s. Initially it referred to the
quality of interventions, and it took time
for the concept of quality patient care to
be introduced. The public health
framework, with its notions of utility and
equity, focused on providing immediate
lifesaving care to as many people as
possible. With the change in the external
environment introducing the need for
more complex medical intervention to
address emerging pandemics such as HIV,
drug-resistant malaria and TB, the
dialogue on medical ethics and the
creation of the Access Campaign, the
emphasis shifted more strongly to the
patient, and how to provide the best
quality of care for him or her. Putting
international medical staff back into a
hands-on role with patients has also
contributed to field pressure not to accept
a double standard of care between
resource-limited and resource-rich
settings.  
It would be a mistake to represent the
choice between best care for the patient
and greater good for more numbers of
people so starkly. In reality, there is a
continual tension between what the best
quality of care is for the patient and what
is best for the population or appropriate
for the setting. Issues of sustainability,
where to set the standard, medical ethics,
and resource choices all come into play.
MSF is in a privileged position in that it
has its own private funds, and therefore
the choices and compromises are often
less than other agencies are forced to
make. Nevertheless, this tension between
the population-based need and that of
the individual patient is a healthy one, as
it forces MSF to continually challenge the
limits of its response.
A project to promote the understanding
and practical use of medical ethics within
the organisation to help with these
deliberations on quality of care, resource
allocation and operational choices was
launched by the Public Health
Department. A number of workshops
were held and documents written to
address the issues. Training on a medical,
ethical framework for decision-making
was introduced at all the coordinator
courses. Intersectionally, MSF-H promoted
the development of an ethical framework
for the movement, which provides
practical guidance on how to use medical
ethics in field missions, including
dilemmas linked to advocacy and closing
projects. 
Taking quality seriously required a way to
measure what was happening in the
programmes. Improving the medical
reporting and internal monitoring of
programmes was a long-term ambition,
which became more acute when
institutional funding and its requirements
for external reporting decreased. The
Public Health Department attempted to
introduce standardised medical reporting
in the late 1990s, and promoted the new
format at co-days 2001. Implementation
was obviously slow, because in 2002-4
one of the objectives of the department
was again to establish a regular system of
reporting.  The slow progress was linked,
in part at least, to the demand driven
structure. While various types of reporting
were mandatory, such as sitreps, all
reporting to the support departments was
at the discretion of the country manager
as to timing and format. More progress
was made when there was agreement
from the management team to
implement a set of standard health
indicators for all programmes in 2005. 
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The indicators reflect measures of volume
and outcomes for the main programme
areas. Over time, they also included
indicators to measure adherence to policy,
such as confirming the diagnosis of
malaria. The standard indicators, together
with the use of standardised data tools for
the main programme areas, allow regular
monitoring of the quality of programmes
from both the perspective of the country
management team based in the capital
and from headquarters level. MSF-H was
ahead of the other sections in
standardising data collection and
reporting, which was in keeping with the
section's reputation for being focused on
process and standardised procedures. 
Quality of care has recently become an
organisational risk management issue. 
MSF has always been a target for court
cases and lawsuits from opportunistic
former employees and landlords, but
recently there have been several examples
of medical liability court cases. This
development may be inevitable, as the
population becomes more educated and
aware in the countries where MSF-H
works. It does, however, demand an
organisational response and may well end
up having a wider impact on where and
how we intervene. 
Diagnostics
In 2003, the Public Health Department
hired its first laboratory advisor. The
importance of having access to good
diagnostics in the programmes, and
ensuring reliability of the results, was
recognised early but now needed expert
input to move it forward. Over five years,
MSF-H transformed the standard in its
laboratories. New standardised operating
procedures were written and translated
into French and Russian. Manuals for
malaria microscopy, TB microscopy, and
numerous other support materials were
developed specifically for field conditions.
New diagnostic methods were trialled in
the field, some to improve the quality of
routine lab tests, others to add to what
the lab could offer. A programme of
annual workshops for lab technicians
ensured that the new materials and
knowledge in headquarters was translated
to the field and, more importantly,
allowed the field to bring issues of
concern from their missions. Quality
control was reinforced. Where
methodology did not exist for quality
control, new ideas were experimented
with - some were more successful than
others. 
The importance of quality control and
proper lab standards was reinforced in
2005 when the problem of false positive
HIV results was discovered. Staff in
Zambia, in Ethiopia and in DRC all
realised that some of the patients in their
programmes had been falsely diagnosed
with HIV on the basis of rapid diagnostic
tests (RDTs). The enormity of the impact
on the affected individuals and their
families galvanised the department to
respond. Procedures and protocols were
tightened, and eventually mandatory
confirmation testing was introduced for
all projects in addition to the WHO
recommended RDT algorithms
47. 
Standardised reporting of the lab's
performance on quality control allowed
HQ to identify problems, and also
provoked internal competition amongst
labs.
48 The success of the laboratory
programme in providing reliable results
for clinicians, and in promoting new
diagnostic tools, was due in large part to
the vision of the lab specialist who led the
development of laboratory support. Many
of the innovations developed
subsequently by the lab group have been
adopted outside MSF. An example is the
methodology for quality control of
malaria microscopy which has been
adopted by WHO. Unfortunately,
promoting the tools internally within the
international MSF network has been
much less successful. 
MSF sans médecins continued
The move towards more medical
programming from that of public health
interventions was reflected in a subtle
shift in the organisation's identity. The
mid-term plans from 2002 onwards start
to emphasise MSF-H as a
medical/humanitarian organisation rather
than the more generic 'humanitarian'
focus of previous strategic documents.
The renewed interest in medical
assistance to individuals as opposed to
emergency public health put the medical
profile of the staff on the agenda - albeit
eight years after the downward trend
started. This move towards more medical
programming and the consequent need
for more medical people in the
organisation came to be known as re-
medicalisation. The MTP for 2002 states: 
47 Klarkowski DB, Wazome JM, Lokuge KM, Shanks L, Mills CF, O'Brien DP. The Evaluation of a Rapid In Situ HIV Confirmation Test in a Programme
with a High Failure Rate of the WHO HIV Two-Test Diagnostic Algorithm. PloS One 2009; 4(2): e4351. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004351
48 Orozco D, Klarkowski D. Implementation of laboratory QC programme in resource limited settings. PloS Medicine January 2010.
“While I worked for MSF, we worked very hard on regaining the medical focus of the
organisation. I am not sure if that has fully succeeded. There was a time when it was
felt that the medical issues were supporting other agendas. It was felt that this needed
to change, and the lack of medical perspective in operational decision-making was a
problem all over the movement. It seemed to be worse in MSF-H, though, as other
sections did have more medical people in their management. In the field, too many of
the MedCos were not doctors. Also, among the HAs there should be a balanced mix of
doctors and nurses, but we always had very few doctors. One of the things done to
increase attention to medical consequences of operational decisions, was that the
Medical Director became part of the MT. 
“The whole idea of separating the medical from the operational is nonsense. We are a
medical organisation: the medics should be taking the lead, receiving advice regarding
politics from the operational people. Now, it's the other way around: decision-making
is all about politics, and the medical programming is only the second priority. To
change this, the medical people should become more assertive.”
Interview with Christa Hook, former MedCo, health advisor and past president of
MSF-UK.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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medical director position was included on
the management team. This change,
however, was a long time in the making.
It came with the re-structuring of the
management team, which grew out of
the changes in the organisation after
implementation of the demand driven
model and line management. The
objectives or criteria to evaluate the
proposed structures were not linked to
medical leadership
51, though the board
did stipulate that one member of the new
management team should have a medical
background.  
Resistance to change
Implementing new therapies and
protocols in MSF-H field programmes to
respond to resistance to commonly used
anti-malarials, to introduce treatment for
HIV patients and to diagnose and treat
multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB) was not
easy. Some consider MSF-H's slowness to
implement these new treatments as a
major organisational failure.
Artemisinin Combination
Treatment  
In 2000, the intersectional malaria
working group concluded that the era of
chloroquine was over, and that MSF
should work to implement Artemisinin
Combination Treatment (ACT) and rapid
diagnostic tests (RDTs) in most settings. In
a policy paper written the following year,
MSF-H stated that "MSF should play a
more significant role in combating
malaria and influencing policy on a global
scale".
52 It reiterated the need for the
introduction of ACTs and RDTs and
highlighted the necessity for monitoring
drug resistance. Subsequently, the MSF-H
annual plan for 2001 included the
implementation of pilot projects and
resistance studies for chloroquine and
Fansidar. In October 2002, the new
intersectional MSF malaria policy took it a
step further, and advocated the
introduction of ACTs for Falciparum
malaria in all field sites.
53
The switch to new treatment often
involved doing a drug-resistance survey to
demonstrate the level of the problem and
to convince the MoH of the need to
switch. Alternatively, the surveys were
used to determine the best combination
of drugs to use. Introduction of the new
drugs involved not only changing
prescribing habits, but also introducing
confirmation of malaria diagnosis through
the use of RDTs. The new Manson Unit
54
in the MSF-UK office took on the task of
helping the field make the change, and
49 Medium Term Policy MSF-Holland 01/2003 - 12/2005. p 23.
50 Paramedical is a term is used to refer to all non-physician medical postings. It includes nurses, lab technicians, mental health officers,
epidemiologists, etc. 
51 Terms of Reference for the Study and Analysis of the MT and HQ structure of MSF-Holland Amsterdam Group. Version Oct 28, 2005. 
52 Veeken H. MSF and malaria into the 21st Century: a policy paper. April 2001.
53 Hook C. MSF Policy on Falciparum Malaria, 21 October 2002.
54 The Manson Unit is a medical unit based in the MSF-UK office that offers expertise to the movement in order to implement new policy change.
Malaria drug-resistance in
Myanmar
The Myanmar mission implemented a large malaria programme aiming at high
coverage of the population. It used community based lay people to perform
microscopy and deliver drugs. The initial evaluation showed that uptake was
poor. One of the factors identified was that the treatment wasn't working. A
drug effectiveness trial was done in 1995 and found high levels of resistance to
chloroquine, but a good response to combination artemisinin and mefloquine.
Negotiations with the MoH led to permission to treat children, pregnant women
and adults with first line failure with ACT in 1996. Two years later the protocol
was extended to all age groups. In 2002 the national protocol changed as a
direct consequence of MSF's drug effectiveness study. 
Frank Smithuis. The development and results of a large-scale malaria project in
Rakhine State, Myanmar. p. 107-120.
We will also re-establish space for MDs,
nurses, midwives etc in the frontlines and all
the way up the organisation, to ensure we
act according to our values and create the
organisational culture and activities that
attract and keeps the type of staff we so
desperately need.
49
The MTPs in both 2000 and 2003 defined
targets for the re-medicalisation objective,
such as one doctor in each project and a
minimum of 50 percent of expat postings
to be people with a medical or
paramedical
50 background with 20
percent medical doctors. There were also
targets for the number of doctors in head
of mission positions and in the
management team. These targets, while
modest, are still proving elusive to attain.
The average figures for doctors and total
paramedical/medical postings for the
period 2000-09 are 19 percent and 45
percent respectively. Few heads of mission
and none of the current operational
managers have a medical or paramedical
profile. The analysis of why it is so difficult
to attract and retain medical and
paramedical staff varies. The external
labour market changes for medical staff
are mentioned in strategic documents
from both the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Other proposed internal factors are a lack
of effective recruiting and retention
strategies, the bureaucratisation of the
MedCo role, which discourages interest
from clinicians, a lack of field positions for
medical profiles, and a lack of medical
role models in management positions.
The objective of re-medicalisation is still
questioned within the organisation. Some
individuals experience it as undermining
their own contribution to MSF, or that of
other non-medical people. On occasions,
it has been argued that medical people
are different to logisticians or finance
administrators in not being capable of or
interested in taking on management
roles. Others reject the idea of quotas for
medical people, while willingly accepting
quotas for French-language speakers. 
A positive change in the management
structure in MSF-OCA took place in 2005
when, for the first time since 1992, the25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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provided implementers who were able to
do the surveys, negotiate - where
necessary - with the MoH, and train the
staff. 
ACT implementation did successfully take
place in all target countries by the
beginning of 2005 -  two years' later than
originally targeted. The timeline is
mapped in annex 6.  An evaluation of
ACT implementation by the Manson Unit
done in 2005-06 analysed the reasons for
the delay and concluded both internal
and external factors were responsible. The
field-driven model allowed the field to set
their own implementation plans and this
meant a lack of priority in some countries.
Competing priorities also played a role -
perhaps more so in areas where resistance
data was not yet available and therefore
the problem was less visible. The active
resistance of some medical staff (national
and expatriate) due to a 'lack of
confidence in ACT' is surprising, especially
now that ACT is so widely implemented,
but underlines how difficult it can be to
change medical practice. 
Teams invested large amounts of time in
lobbying MoHs for permission to use ACT.
MoHs were reluctant to change national
protocols due to the expense and, at the
same time, were reluctant to allow
exceptions for MSF-supported structures
within the MoH systems. Advocacy at the
international level with donors, WHO and
others was often needed to push this
forward, and the role of the Access
Campaign was critical. 
Once MoH approval was obtained, actual
implementation took place from one to
eight months later. Reasons for this delay
seem to be lack of planning (e.g. drugs
not ordered, RDTs not yet implemented)
or an inability to operate on parallel track,
whereby permission is sought from the
MoH at the same time as preparations are
being made for implementation. Similar
delays continue to be seen with
implementation of second-line drug
treatment for MDR TB. 
Antiretroviral treatment
Since the early debates on AIDS
programs, MSF-H has become engaged in
a variety of AIDS programmes, including
implementing a needle exchange
programme in Russian prisons, treating
STIs among Burmese sex trade workers,
doing behaviour change on the beaches
of Cuba, and helping people with AIDS
die in Zambia. The Vancouver AIDS
conference in 1996 introduced the world
to combination antiretroviral (ARV)
treatment, which dramatically changed
the face of AIDS in the West. In 1998, the
PHD Annual Plan stated that ARV
treatment would not be started before its
feasibility could be properly considered.
This 'consideration' turned out to be a
lengthy meditation: 
MSF-H also needed a long time to put HIV
on the agenda. The price for ARVs was
considered too high to commit to treatment
programmes. And there was also the fear
that low adherence would lead to
resistance. And what were the implications
for MSF-H as an organisation? ARV is a
lifelong commitment, and MSF is present
only temporarily. At some point we felt we
should just try it.
55
55 Interview with Riekje Elema, health advisor
“The new policy was received enthusiastically in most missions. But, in some, field
staff refused to implement it. This happened in Sierra Leone and in Nigeria, where
MedCos considered it inappropriate to use these effective treatments and refused.
And there was no structure to enforce the policy. HQ responded inadequately to the
issue, which also relates to the problem of having a non-medical operational line.
The operational managers were the only ones who could enforce decisions. But they
didn't understand the issue enough to really acknowledge the need to act upon this.
Finally, it was many months before we pulled out the management team from
Nigeria because of disregarding the policy and, in so doing, negating one of the key
purposes of the mission. During that time, it is highly likely that many children died
because they received the wrong treatment.” 
Christa Hook
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type, tending instead to be more disease-
focused. They were fully committed to
providing a high standard of care to their
patients, and were not at all troubled by
utilitarian arguments of resource division.
If it was possible, they believed, it should
be done: cost was rarely part of the
equation for these clinicians. This dynamic
fed into the organisation, contributing to
a change of focus that was more on
individual patients and which was critical
of medicine being delivered with a double
standard, according to whether the
patient lived in the developed or
developing world. This stance was very
much supported and promoted by the
Access Campaign. These programmes
also forced longer-term project planning
on the organisation, which otherwise
tended to work on one-year project
cycles, and put a focus on handover
strategies to assure continuation of
treatment after MSF left.
The accepted agreement was that it was
unthinkable to provide ARV treatment in
conflict settings. And yet this was
precisely where MSF was working. The
first project in a conflict setting was
Bukavu in DRC. ARV treatment
commenced in October 2003, after much
planning and investment, and MSF was
the first provider of ARV treatment in
eastern Congo. Scarcely seven months
later, the city of Bukavu was under attack,
and many of the population - including
the expatriate team - evacuated across
the border. Thanks to the efforts of the
staff remaining, the clinics were still able
to provide drugs, and key lessons in
contingency planning were learned. This
positive experience significantly helped to
reassure doubters in the organisation that
ARV treatment for conflict-affected
populations was feasible and safe. 
The integration of HIV care into regular
MSF programmes was a particular
challenge. The vertical programmes
started with clear project commitments
on the length of stay, but integrated ones
were much less predictable. The message
that a sudden stop of drugs was not
going to cause resistance needed to be
fully understood. Next was the
acceptance that if a sudden exit was
required, MSF-H could and would stop
treatment. The minimum length of
treatment in order to provide at least a
temporary restoration of the immune
system, and hence quality of life, was
judged to be six months. Projects that
had the intention of being present for at
least six months should then plan to offer
ARV treatment. In reality, the
commitment has always been longer, and
no patients have yet had to stop due to
lack of a handover partner. However, it
was important for the acceptance of ARV
treatment outside vertical programmes to
have these understandings to avoid
resistance from operations.
Integration of HIV was also difficult in that
project teams were often overwhelmed
with heavy demands running busy and
complex programmes. There were often
more visible and pressing priorities for the
medical teams' attention. HIV prevalence
in the hospital wards and in the TB and
antenatal care programmes was hidden if
testing was not being done. It took a
concerted push from headquarters, led by
strong HIV advisors, to make it happen. 
Drug-resistant tuberculosis
The first drug-resistant TB programme
was in Uzbekistan. MSF started by
initiating a DOTS (directly observed
treatment, short course) programme in
three regions of Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. It scaled up progressively
between 1998 and 2003 to achieve
coverage. The early finding that 10
percent of the smear positives did not
convert with standard first-line treatment
prompted a drug resistance survey in
both countries. The findings were
worrying: overall levels of multidrug-
resistant TB (MDR-TB) in the MSF DOTS
programme were 27 percent in
Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan, and 11
percent in Dashoguz, Turkmenistan. For
five years this was the only MDR-TB
programme in MSF-H. Measured against
the small numbers of patients treated,
and even fewer cured, this was a hugely
expensive and complex programme that
generated little enthusiasm for more
investment. Non-medics, in particular,
struggled with an expensive programme
that, in 2008, started approximately 250
new patients, and over time achieved
variable rates of successful treatment
completion from 53 to 70 percent. 
The Access Campaign worked on getting
prices down, and the International
Council passed resolutions to make
encourage it to happen. By the end of
2001, ARV treatment started to be
delivered in resource limited settings by
MSF-France in Africa. It was another two
years before MSF-H would start the first
patient on drugs in its African and Asian
HIV programmes. There were long
debates with the board and the
association as to the feasibility and
wisdom of starting treatment for what
was a lifelong disease. Implementing TB
and HIV in unstable conflict settings
required a change in thinking.
Progress was first made in Ukraine where
ARVs were administered as part of a
prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (PMTCT) programme. It
extended in 2002 to giving drugs to
infected babies and finally to the parents.
Next to start ARV treatment were projects
in Zambia, Myanmar and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003. Each
of these projects received a commitment
of three to five years in order to have
sufficient time to develop the programme
and execute a handover plan. 
The experience of the vertical
programmes was critical to learning in the
organisation, and in many ways changed
the nature of MSF. The staff who were
recruited were often less of the
humanitarian-focused tropical-doctor
Unfortunately treatment of TB and
AIDS in unstable environment is by
most health professionals still seen as
impossible and so far we seem to be
one of the few agencies even trying
to find answers. We have developed
some ideas over the past year, but
have so far not been very successful
in building confidence amongst field
teams (or maybe even ourselves) on
their feasibility. At least it has as yet
not resulted in the start of
programmes in conflict situations
(with exception of one TB cohort in S
Sudan). This is where further
innovation is needed.
PHD Annual Plan 200225 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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The common wisdom in the TB
community at the time was that first an
adequate DOTS programme must be in
place, and then a DOTS-Plus programme.
This ignored the fact that, in contexts of
high drug resistance such as Central Asia,
drug regimens recommended by WHO
were actually driving resistance. The result
was a long delay to start second-line
drugs, fuelled by an ambition for
coverage of DOTS for the population, a
handover, and then a separate parallel
programme to treat second-line patients
with resistance. In retrospect, it is clear
that this false separation between first and
second-line TB programmes was the
wrong choice, and now the project is
reorienting to treat TB in all its forms by
introducing rapid molecular testing for
drug resistance at the first point of
contact for the patient. 
Shabunda, DRC, was the improbable
location for the next MDR-TB treatment
programme. This isolated village in the
middle of the forests of eastern Congo
had been the site of an MSF project
responding to years of war in the region.
MSF had a large and successful TB
programme, with good support from the
MoH, but several patients were not
responding to category 2 treatment. The
second-mission expat, whose first mission
was in the MDR-TB programme in
Uzbekistan, could not accept that the
only recourse was to send these patients
home to infect their communities and die.
A proposal was made to test and treat
these patients and sold to headquarters. A
key issue was having a viable handover
strategy, as the context was now post-
conflict, and it was not clear how long
MSF would be staying. Approval was
granted, but further delays came from the
provincial Ministry of Health. Eventually
the patients were started, with sputum
monitoring samples travelling by
chartered airline to Goma, then by courier
to Europe. The project closed after the
intensive phase finished but, as MSF was
still in-country, the TB doctor continued
to support the MoH to monitor the
patients until the end of their treatment.
All patients successfully completed their
treatment, and the regular visits of the
MSF doctor allowed the HIV patients on
ARVs to continue their treatment and
monitoring in the absence of a handover
partner in Shabunda.
A policy change to integrate second-line
diagnosis and treatment into all TB
programmes was made in 2007/08.
Implementation is slow, due to initial
resistance within the Medical Department
and in the field. Where agreement had
been made to go ahead, the next phase
of delays came from ministries of health
on the level of memorandum of
understandings (MoU) or drug
importation. Some members of the MSF-
H board and OCA council continue to be
reluctant to make this change, finding it
overly ambitious and 'impractical'. The
complexity of the programme, the
amount of resources for a small number
of patients, and a lack of belief in the
problem of drug resistance, are all cited
as reasons to place priorities elsewhere.
Progress is being made, with six projects
now offering drug-resistant treatment,
but the culture change required has been
every bit as difficult as implementing ACT,
psychiatry in primary care and HIV
treatment. 
The slowness to adopt new treatments in
MSF-H can be attributed to a number of
causes.  The lack of medical people in
decision-making positions, a relative lack
of strong medical voices elsewhere in HQ
and the field, and the complexity that
comes with the integrated program
model all contribute to various degrees.
Lastly the MSF-H board and OCA Council
has often been difficult to convince.  This
contrasts with other sections where the
associative more often functions as a
driver of change rather than the brakes.
New nutritional strategies:
adopting the RUTF revolution
Therapeutic feeding programmes were
based on inpatient care for severely
acutely malnourished (SAM) children, and
an outpatient supplementary programme
for moderately acutely malnourished
(MAM) children, which often also
included pregnancy and lactating
women. The programmes for SAM
provided good quality care but were
unable to respond to high numbers of
patients. Nor did they lend themselves to
high geographic coverage, especially in
insecure settings. In 2000, strategies
started to be tested for community or
home-based treatment. A first trial from
Ethiopia with Save the Children was
reported the following year. MSF began
to experiment with the new model,
initially a hybrid between the Ambulatory
Therapeutic Feeding Program (ATFP)
model of today and the classic approach.
Children underwent phase one as
inpatients and then, when stable, were
discharged to complete the second phase
of treatment. 
The development of ready-to-eat
therapeutic food (RUTF), a high energy
spread used to replace the F100 milk used
in classic programmes, made the home-
based model feasible on a large scale.
Plumpy'Nut® samples were sent to south
Sudan in the late 1990s, where it was
tried out. Security problems forced the
team to evacuate shortly afterwards but,
in the limited pilot, it worked well. In
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Countries with TFP 14 18 17 17 18
Projects with TFP 30 36 43 38 45
Ambulatory programmes 17 24 34 36 42
Admissions in TFP 16,324 11,976 16,228 34,960 41,860
Admissions in SFP 42,902 11,939 13,807 4,914 1,391
% TFP programmes ATFC 56% 66% 79% 95% 93%
% Programmes with WHO references 0 0 37% 80% 86%
Table 1: MSF OCA Therapeutic Feeding Programmes 2005-0925 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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(FGM) or infibulation
57. Despite the
programmes, there was very little
organisational focus on reproductive
healthcare until the mid-2000s. However,
a number of policy decisions were taken
forward. Guidance on responding to FGM
was given in 1999, reinforced with a
formal policy statement in 2006 stating
MSF-H's opposition to any form of FGM
and refusal to take part in reinfibulation
for women post-partum. Safe abortion
care was introduced in response to the
International Council resolution in 2002,
though implementation continues to be
challenging, particularly in countries
where abortion is illegal. 
Gender issues have received little
organisational attention in MSF-H. Most
other organisations in the sector adopted
clear policies and tools to address gender
in programming. Undoubtedly for some
NGOs this was donor driven - a factor
that MSF in the 2000s rarely needed to
deal with, due to the predominance of
private funds. While sexual violence was
recognised as an issue in refugee settings
early on in the field, there was
recognition - but little formal response -
of the need for the protection of women
as vulnerable groups. An example is the
evaluation of an environmental health
programme in Darfur done in 1999. The
evaluator notes that female-headed
households were not identified as a
specific vulnerable group amongst the
displaced in terms of receiving extra
priority in the latrine building
programme. He confidently concludes,
however, that as the coverage in these
households was just less than that in the
total population, the women managed to
construct latrines as well as the rest of the
population without special arrangements
by MSF
58. The absence of understanding
of the vulnerabilities of this population is
striking. Currently there is no formal
policy on how gender is taken into
account in either watsan or other
programmes. Specific advice and mention
is present but there is not a systematic
emphasis. 
Sexual violence
MSF staff members have been faced with
survivors of sexual violence throughout
the years of operation. In the mid-1990s,
56 Evaluation of Supplementary Feeding Programs in Darfur, Somalia and Uganda. MSF-H. October 2005. 
57  Soeters R. Famine Relief Northern Darfur. Evaluation of a supplementary Feeding Program for MSF-H. Second edition. Feb 
58 Oudman M, PhD. Environmental Health for the Displaced in Greater Khartoum, Sudan. 1992-1998. Evaluation Report. January 1999. p11.
2003, a campaign began to promote the
new strategy in the office and field. The
programme in Marere, Somalia, was the
first real success of the new model, and
the results were used to promote the
model within MSF as a whole. Marere
implemented the new strategy in
response to overcrowding at the feeding
centre, and high defaulter rates because
women were not able to stay full-time in
the centre due to other responsibilities. In
2005, the official policy changed to make
ambulatory feeding programmes the
standard model of care. In some countries
there was difficulty switching due to the
MoH reluctance to adopt the new model.
Once the switch was made, it was realised
that defaulter rates were very high in
some programmes. This needed to be
systematically addressed with good
strategies to educate the caretakers and
improve defaulter tracing. 
Also in 2005, there was an evaluation of
the supplementary feeding programmes
in MSF, prompted by concerns about
their impact. While the evaluation
stopped short of saying that the impact
was poor, it did conclude that
supplementary programmes should not
be a standard approach in nutritional
problems in communities
56. 
The decision on what to do with the
poorly performing supplementary
programmes was made easier when the
WHO adopted new growth standards in
2006. Using these new standards and
definitions for severe malnutrition meant
effectively widening the inclusion criteria
for children into the therapeutic feeding
programmes. The new growth standards
were adopted, along with a decision to
phase out supplementary feeding
programmes, with the rationale that most
high-risk children were now included in
the new criteria for SAM. 
Medical advocacy
MSF-H realised that being a catalyst for
change - the major theme in the 2000
MTP - could refer to more than changing
the humanitarian agenda. The medics
knew this already, and had been investing
in changing medical practice in kala azar,
in the treatment for sleeping sickness and
in introducing ACT to Myanmar. But it
did not get translated into any
organisational priority until the mid-
2000s. The Access Campaign
undoubtedly put medical advocacy high
on the agenda, as did the medical policy
changes that insisted on a choice of drugs
for sexually transmitted infections which
took into account the risk of antibiotic
resistance. The model of catalyst for
change became a compelling reason to
invest in improvements in medical care in
the missions as, despite a potentially
heavy investment for a small number of
patients, it could be viewed as a means to
provoke a wider change in medical
practice. This was the case with ARV
treatment provision in HIV patients in the
smaller integrated settings and also with
MDR-TB integration.
While effective advocacy was done on a
country level, MSF-H is not well known
for medical advocacy on major themes in
the same way as MSF-Belgium or MSF-
France, for instance. The Humanitarian
Affairs Department, despite being situated
for a number of years in the Public Health
Department, did not do medical
advocacy and there were no other
resources in headquarters assigned to do
so, with the exception of the Access
Campaign. The successful initiatives that
did emerge on medical advocacy were
due largely to the interest and
commitment of individuals in the Public
Health Department and in the field. There
were some attempts to develop a
platform to work on initiatives through a
working group that engaged
humanitarian affairs, operations,
communications and the Public Health
Department; however, the initiative seems
never to have got off the ground. It is also
likely that the choice for integrated
programmes in conflict settings meant
that some advocacy initiatives, such as
promoting ARV treatment in conflict
settings, required a strategy other than a
high profile campaign. 
Women's health 
Reproductive healthcare has long been
part of MSF-H's response. The first MSF
mission in Darfur worked with midwives
and provided them with safe delivery kits,
including ergometrine tablets and surgical
instruments to deal with the obstetrical
consequences of female genital mutilation25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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the topic became very prominent with
media attention on rapes perpetrated in
the former Yugoslavia and those linked to
the Rwandan genocide. In 1995, UNHCR
published their first guidelines for
prevention and response to sexual
violence in refugee settings. MSF's
response was ad hoc at best, and
depended very much on the individual
team members as to whether it was
recognised and treated. This was despite
the mental health programmes, which
had clearly come across sexual violence
linked to conflict, for example when
working in the Great Lakes during the
refugee crisis following the Rwandan
genocide
59. In the late 1990s, the Public
Health Department attempted to put the
issue on the agenda, but the issue did not
get taken up by operations until the
release of the UNHCR/Save the Children
exposé on (s)exploitation in West Africa
in 2002. The report and subsequent
investigation exposed allegations of aid
workers trading aid for sexual favours
and included a mention of MSF. The
international movement reacted
immediately to the report, and each
section reviewed the adequacy of its
own measures to protect against
exploitation of beneficiaries by MSF staff.
Ironically, while the report was about
exploitation, it acted within MSF-H as a
catalyst to push forward support for
sexual violence care, where all the
attention in Bosnia and Rwanda years
earlier had not succeeded. 
The first action was to put in place a
working group with members from the
Public Health Department, humanitarian
affairs and operations. A researcher was
hired in 2003 to review the situation in
several key countries, and to implement
clear case management guidelines. Sexual
violence has remained high on the
agenda since then, but the question
remains why it took so long to be
recognised outside of the PHD.
Fistula camps 
In the remote village of Shabunda, in
eastern DRC, the medical team
identified women presenting with
sexual violence who had genital fistula
due to violent rape. Constantly leaking
urine, the women were ostracised by
their communities. Shocked by their
situation, the team organised to
evacuate the women by plane to a
specialised hospital where they were
able to have their fistulas repaired. The
surgery was life changing for the
women, as they were able to return to
their villages without the persistent
leakage and accompanying odour. The
programme continued into 2002, with
MSF facilitating and paying for the
transport and surgery. 
Sierra Leone is home to the world's
worst maternal mortality figures. MSF-H
was responding to the brutal war
between the RUF and government
forces. The destruction of health
facilities impacted on the already poor
access of women to emergency
obstetric care. The field teams
recognised the problem of obstetrical
fistulas in 2004. Women were
presenting with leaking urine due to
the creation of an opening between the
vagina and the bladder due to
obstructed labour. A gynaecologist was
recruited and, in early 2005, 86
patients were operated on to have their
fistulas repaired. At the same time,
training was done. 
The experience from Sierra Leone and
reports from other countries highlighted
the need for access to safe delivery and
caesarean sections where needed. It was
recognised by the reproductive health
advisor that more needed to be done to
put this in place if the fistulas were to be
prevented. Once achievements had been
made in getting the basics present, it was
decided to train a group of surgeons to
59 Shanks L, Schull MJ. Rape in War: the humanitarian response. CMAJ 2000; 163(9): 1152-6
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repair the fistulas. The model of a
surgical camp was set up. The
surgeons would fly in, operate for
several weeks, then leave the team
with wards of women with catheters.
The model was successfully tried out
at the end of 2007 in Somalia and
Katanga, DRC. Since then, annual
camps have been held in a variety of
countries.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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Environmental disasters
MSF-H has focused mainly on the standard
list of responses to major disease outbreaks,
natural disasters and conflict. There are,
however, exceptions and unusual contexts
where MSF-H has intervened over the
years. Response to a handful of
environment disasters is one of these. 
In 1987, Guyana identified an outbreak of
poisoning from thallium sulphate used as a
rodenticide in the sugar plantations. The
news prompted public panic, and the
European Community requested MSF-H to
intervene. A team arrived with testing
equipment and was quickly able to
establish that the levels were much lower
than initially thought and the risk to the
population was low. The intervention was
short-lived, but it marked the first response
to an environmental crisis. 
In 1995, an exploratory mission to French
Polynesia was launched by the Programmes
Department to determine if a humanitarian
response was needed to combat the health
consequences of nuclear testing. No
programme intervention was launched, but
an advocacy campaign followed, with
meetings with the French government
encouraging them to take responsibility for
the health effects, an article in Le Monde
and a paper in the Lancet. 
The Aral Sea desiccation in Uzbekistan has
been described as one of the world's
greatest environmental disasters. MSF-H
launched a project in Karakalpakstan to
investigate if there was a link between the
disaster and public health issues in the
region. There was also interest in
investigating the consequences of the
economic and health infrastructure decline
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This
marked the start of an unusual project for
MSF. The key objective was operational
research. A consortium of experts from
universities in the UK, Canada and the US
worked together with a local research
group. Various issues were looked at,
including hypertension linked to the
hypersalinity, anaemia and renal failure. In
the end, no concrete link was found. The
research did demonstrate major concerns
with TB, and the project shifted to that of a
vertical TB project. 
In 2010, the emergency response team in
Nigeria investigated reports of high
mortality in several villages in Zamfara state.
The team was in the midst of responding to
a meningitis and measles outbreak, as well
as a suspected Lassa fever outbreak in a
neighbouring state. The teams were initially
puzzled by what they found. In one village
at least 30 percent of the children under five
had died over the last year. In the health
centre, the story was of children presenting
with convulsions and coma. 
Many of them were testing positive for
malaria, and the infants had bulging
fontanelles, suggesting meningitis.
However, there were also reports that the
villages had recently seen an increase in
artisanal gold mining activity. Blood
samples were sent to a reference lab in
Germany to determine if heavy metals
were responsible. The results were
startling: all eight children and both adults
tested had levels at least ten times the alert
level. One expert reviewing the report
described it as the worst heavy metal
poisoning in modern times. MSF's
experience in responding to lead poisoning
was non-existent. A network of experts was
mobilised quickly and a response plan
developed with their support. 
The occasional nature of the response to
environmental disasters has not led to the
development of any institutional
knowledge on the effects of pollution or
environmental/ecological disasters.
However, on each occasion MSF was able
to mobilise the required expertise. The
question remains as to whether these
events merit a more systematic investment.
Engaging with health systems
and the user fee debate
One of the most consistent strategic
choices MSF-H has made since the ABC
discussions is not to engage in health
system building. It is recognised that
engagement with health systems is
necessary, but MSF-H has never seen its
role as building health systems. This is
due to the longer-term engagement and
different skillset needed for this work.
However, often one of the tools to ensure
handover of programmes or continuation
of an important medical policy choice,
such as ACT, can be training and capacity
building. HIV has pushed this border, as
will other chronic diseases that require
strong handover plans. 
A challenge of interacting with health
systems is that of cost recovery or user
fees in countries where MSF-H is
intervening. In 2002, an international
consultancy looked into MSF's interaction
in the field with cost recovery and
participation fees from patients. As
described in the terms of reference: 
In recent years, MSF has been requested, by
authorities of certain countries, to
implement or participate in cost
recovery/participation (CR/P) programs in
the hospitals or clinics in which we work.
(By the term "cost recovery" in this study we
mean the payment for medical services
and/or drugs by patients.)There are
increasing concerns about the impact of
these programmes on beneficiaries,
particularly because these initiatives are
being implemented in unstable economic
environments and war zones
60. 
The study involved surveys in four key
countries. The survey revealed the fact
that MSF was definitely participating in
user fees for patients in a number of
countries. Often this was at the insistence
of the MoH but, in other cases, it was
because the teams believed that cost
recovery was the best long-term solution
for the population: 
"The MSF team believed in the possibility
that the healthcare could be self-sufficient
after a certain period. Something that the
present team does see now that it is not
possible."
61
However, in DRC, for example, all the
project coordinators came to the same
conclusion: 
"We have realised that the current strategy
of cost recovery, albeit subsidised, is not
resulting in sufficient increase of utilisation
of health structures. We think that it may
still be too early for any form of cost
recovery in North Kivu."
62
The results of the consultancy led to a
policy change agreed by all sections at
the general director level in January 2004: 
As a humanitarian association dedicated to
assisting people in times of crisis, and
60 TOR Coordinator, Cost Recovery Study, 2002.
61 Peter Rietveld, Project Coordinator, Lokutu, DRC, 04-09-10.
62 Danielle Pronk, Project Coordinator, North Kivu, DRC, 30-09-02.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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assisting the most vulnerable without
discriminating, we can no longer accept to
produce or even allow exclusion within our
projects.
63
This international decision did not
produce any immediate changes within
MSF-H. User fees were still operating
throughout 2004 in certain countries until
the new medical director pushed the issue
with operations. This resulted in the
management team putting out a position
paper on the topic instructing the field
firmly on the issue. In settings such as
DRC, where there was strong pressure
from the MoH, the change in policy was
aided by surveys looking at the impact on
health seeking behaviour of user fees,
even the small symbolic fees that MSF
had negotiated as an alternative to full
cost recovery. By the end of 2006 user
fees were phased out in all MSF-H
countries. The exception - as was so often
the case-was Myanmar where, under the
radar of headquarters, the malaria
programme with lay microscopists was
still charging nominal fees to patients. It
took a visit from the humanitarian affairs
advisor in 2008 to expose the practice
and get it changed. 
Responding to insecure
contexts 
The explicit organisational choices for
conflict as the intervention priority in
MSF-H demanded that the medical
responses were adapted. In reality, much
of the response to conflict in the 1990s
was in safe areas - responding to the
population once they had fled the conflict
area. The organisation had already
invested in standardised approaches to
refugee settings in camps, and to a
certain extent these were the easy
interventions. The department recognised
the challenge in adapting responses to
open settings from camps as the context
changed. New contexts that demanded a
response were urban violence, where
MSF-H operationally had less experience
in negotiating access with gang members
etc. Programming challenges were also
often difficult in order to identify needs
for MSF-H to address. In Papua New
Guinea, a new project was proposed to
respond to astoundingly high levels of
societal violence with a sexual violence
programme. The mission was debated
fiercely, as many felt it did not fit into the
intervention criteria. Eventually, however,
it was accepted and, as the reports from
shell-shocked expats and HQ visitors
trickled back to the office, they quickly
erased any concerns that the mission did
not meet the intervention criteria. 
However, adapting MSF-H's model of
sexual violence care and mental health to
a context of societal violence is proving
difficult. The programme has struggled,
as the old ways of working cannot simply
be translated to this new context. The
uptake of the sexual violence programme
proved much lower than anticipated, and
the programme has pragmatically
widened its objective to include victims of
domestic violence and not just survivors
of sexual violence. 
The 2007-2010 strategic plan announced
a focus on direct victims of violence,
specifically war wounded, those with
mental trauma, and sexual violence. The
distinction was made with the indirect
medical effects of violence, such as those
arising from displacement and disruption
of healthcare. The difficulty with focusing
on war wounded is that it demands
operational presence during the height of
the conflict if MSF is going to have a
lifesaving response. Instead, MSF is often
either forcibly kept out of the war zone,
as occurred in the final months of the war
in Sri Lanka in 2008, or leaves voluntarily
due to unacceptably high security risks.
The surgical response then becomes one
of responding to those with injuries that
are not immediately life-threatening and
can make it to relative safety. The clear
needs are for immediate resuscitation in
the so called 'golden hour' of trauma
response. The dilemma is similar to that
of natural disasters, where the window for
major impact with medical and surgical
interventions is small. The challenge has
become more acute in the current
strategic plan period due to the global
context changes post-9/11, and the
highly insecure countries MSF-H now
finds itself trying to respond in. Serious
security incidents that have impacted
significantly on the organisation include
kidnappings in the Caucasus in the early
2000s, the murder of five MSF team
members in Bagdhis, Afghanistan, in
2004, and a targeted bombing in
Kismayo, Somalia in 2008 that killed three
colleagues. Organisationally, the result is
that MSF-H is less risk-tolerant, and the
days of teams in the field taking their own
security decisions and informing HQ
weeks after the fact are long gone. 
The Iraqi war was a context where MSF-H
felt it should be present due to the high
level of violence against civilians and the
major disruption to the health system. In
2004, all international staff were
evacuated due to the high levels of
insecurity for aid workers. A programme
of support to emergency wards and
operating theatres in hospitals in five
areas affected by the fighting was started
in 2006. Essentially it was a drug
distribution programme, similar to the
programme in Bosnia, yet with a critical
difference - no MSF staff presence. The
strategy was to bring out the hospital
directors and surgeons from the hospitals
to Jordan for training, updates on the
programme and introduction to basic
principles of emergency psychological first
aid. The training aspect of the
programme was judged successful. The
impact of the drug supply programme
was felt to be 'invaluable' by the Iraqi
hospital directors
64, but was impossible to
objectively assess. Statistics on surgeries
performed were commonly understood to
be 'wholly fictitious', and MSF's proximity
to the victims was limited to a handful of
senior Iraqi doctors. In 2009, a strategy
change was made, due to both a
decrease in violence and to less tolerance
internally for the 'remote support'
operational strategy that had now been
ongoing for three years and was costing
significant amounts. Assessments were
made of several areas for new
intervention, but the result was that either
no gaps in the response existed or those
that did exist needed a response with full
international staff presence - which at the
time was judged impossible. Finally the
conclusion was that mental health was
the only significant gap where MSF could
respond effectively. A proposal was made
to start a mental health programme that
would involve an international staff
presence in the form of visits, and the
hiring of MSF Iraqi staff. The proposal
launched a heated debate. Was it
acceptable to put MSF staff lives at risk for
63 MSF policy (excerpt from “User fees -Dying for growth” paper endorsed by ExCom, Jan 2004)
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a programme that was not lifesaving?
After much debate, and with serious
concerns from the Dutch board, it was
given the go-ahead. The Iraq example
points to the dilemma of wanting to work
in conflict affected areas but not having
the operational presence to actually
respond and, further, often not being able
to identify strong medical needs. 
Operational research 
MSF-H became involved in research at an
early stage, something that distinguished
it from many other medical humanitarian
agencies
65. The first paper published in
the scientific literature was in 1989, a
description of the kala azar epidemic in
south Sudan in the Lancet. MSF's
involvement in research was driven by the
lack of knowledge in the wider medical
community on how to respond to the
unique challenges the teams were facing
in the field. Neglected diseases were an
obvious area for investment, as there was
simply no commercial interest in
developing proper diagnostics for kala
azar or better treatment regimens for
sleeping sickness. Most of MSF-H's
research contributions are retrospective
analyses of routine programme results.
Where protocols did not exist or were not
adapted, field teams would try something
new and then document the experience.
The documentation often did not
happen, as teams were chronically short
of time and the expertise to analyse and
write up these experiences. The Public
Health Department continually
complained about the lack of dedicated
support for operational research and for
analysing and disseminating the
experience. Some MSF medics used their
field experiences to work on a PhD, and
this proved important in producing a
body of work on topics of relevance to
MSF field operations such as resistance to
anti-malarials in Myanmar, the response
to meningitis outbreaks, TB in Central
Asia and the diagnosis and treatment of
kala azar. This relied on individuals with
an interest in operational research and in
documenting MSF's experience to
produce the publications. Research
support - in the form of an over-taxed
health advisor/epidemiologist - arrived in
2006, and grew to three full-time
epidemiologists when the Manson Unit in
the London office added epidemiology to
its areas of support. 
Major operational research achievements
that resulted in changing practice include
the work on kala azar already described
and the work on sleeping sickness. MSF-H
initiated the work that led to the
adoption by WHO of a new shorter
treatment for sleeping sickness called
NECT, or Nifurtimox-Eflornithine
Combination Therapy. The trials were a
collaboration with Epicentre and, later,
the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative
(DNDi). These research initiatives were
driven by the refusal of field doctors to
accept the painful and poorly effective
treatment protocols in existence. Malaria
drug effectiveness studies done again in
combination with other MSF sections
have contributed to policy change to ACT
in a number of countries where MSF
works. Reporting routine programme
experience and outcomes from TB and
HIV programmes in conflict and unstable
settings contributed to gaining
acceptance of these strategies to offer
care to populations otherwise excluded
from care. Documentation of the MSF-H
mental health programmes and
experience contributed to a substantial
body of knowledge of these interventions. 
The need for operational research to
improve the care MSF was providing to
patients in the field led to the
identification of the need for an ethical
review board (ERB) for MSF use. Review
boards either did not exist, or were not
sufficiently independent in many of the
countries in which MSF was working.
MSF's obligation to protect vulnerable
populations extended to research
subjects, and academic ERBs might not
have the same understanding of the
vulnerability and equity issues in MSF
settings. The proposal to set up an
independent ERB was taken by the head
of the Public Health Department to the
medical directors of the other sections.
The result was the creation in 2002 of an
independent MSF Ethical Review Board to
be used by all MSF sections. In the first
year of operation, MSF-H got approval
from the new ERB for the first three
proposals submitted: a malaria
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effectiveness study, a trial of two kala azar
drugs in a high prevalence HIV setting in
Ethiopia, and a report on justice and
humanitarian aid distribution in south
Sudan. 
Collaboration with academic institutes
and networks of experts has been
important since the early days. The
medical working group and then the early
Public Health Department relied on these
networks for expertise. Most of the links
have been in response to immediate field
or institutional needs for external support
which align with the academic interest of
the institution. The links are often
informal, with individuals rather than
institutions, and rely heavily on personal
contacts. They have resulted in significant
contribution to MSF field missions and
also to the wider scientific community.
There has been less willingness from MSF-
H to invest in developing proactive links
with institutions without clear benefit for
MSF-H or without the personal
relationships that have facilitated the
willingness on the part of individuals in
the department. Attempts by the
Canadian MSF section to set up a formal
collaboration with the British Colombia
Centre of Excellence for HIV and AIDS
were prolonged and demanded
significant effort and discussion. Lack of
trust between the two MSF sections and
suspicion of internal political agendas
complicated the issue. While the
collaboration did bear some results, it is
fair to say it did not reach its potential. 
Conclusion
MSF-Holland's first project in 1984 was a cholera intervention. At the time of
writing, MSF-OCA is responding to outbreaks of cholera in post-flood Pakistan, in
northern Nigeria, and in an unofficial refugee camp for Rohingas in Bangladesh.
Teams these days are better prepared, have an MSF guideline to read on the plane,
and with luck have attended an intensive course in outbreak response prior to
being sent out. No doubt this results in a better quality of the response than that
in 1984 in Gannad Camp in Somalia. Since this first project, MSF-H has succeeded,
together with the other MSF sections, in developing and documenting standard
approaches to responding to major health emergencies. The approach developed
in response to these large-scale emergency contexts was that of emergency public
health, which focused on medical activities, supported by water and sanitation,
nutrition and later mental health. At this period in time, MSF-H's operations were
distinguished less by the medical care delivered and more by the ability of the
organisation to be present and deliver results in hard-to-access, unstable settings. 
The last ten years have seen a shift in focus. MSF-H has become more medical in
its approach, due to the strategic shift towards a people-centred rather than a
population-centred response. MSF is now recognised not only for its ability to
operate in difficult contexts, but for the quality and standard of medical care it
aims to achieve. The ambition has not simply been to transplant medical progress
in the West to resource-limited settings, but rather to adapt the innovations to
what is effective and feasible in the contexts where MSF intervenes. This approach
has led to successes, such as the advances made in the diagnosis and treatment of
neglected diseases, as well as proving the feasibility of ART and TB treatment in
conflict settings. A critical stimulus to success and innovation has been the refusal
of field teams and advisors to accept the status quo, such as ineffective drugs for
malaria, or painful, risky treatments for sleeping sickness, or the exclusion of
vulnerable groups from access to TB treatment. Wider implementation of these
protocol changes across all the missions, however, has often been slow. Successful
adoption of policy change has relied on capitalisation of learning from pilot
projects, and the presence of champions in headquarters who are able to convince
operations (and sometimes their own colleagues) and eventually the board of the
need to move forward. 
The persistent lack of medical profiles in positions of line management in concert
with a management model that puts the Public Health Department in a support
role to operations has been a significant impediment to moving forward with some
needed medical programmes. Decentralisation of decision-making to the field,
while bringing benefits, has in the case of medical policy sometimes allowed
unacceptable medical practice to continue and slowed down the introduction of
new innovations. If MSF-OCA wants to continue the focus on stronger medical
programming and at the same time to adapt to the changing contexts and disease
burdens, then the issue of investment in medical leadership at all levels of the
organisation will finally have to be effectively addressed. 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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Appendix 1
Methodology: 
The methodology for this document
consists of a survey distributed at the
2010 Annual General Assembly to
Association members, and to medical
coordinators and senior national staff in
the field. Additional interviews with key
informants were conducted by Saskia Baas
during July to early September, 2010.
Individuals interviewed are as follows: 
Barbara Lopes-Cardozo, 
Christa Hook
Clair Mills 
Egbert Sondorp 
Gunilla Kuperus
Khaled Menapal
Koert Ritmeijer 
Lex Winkler
Lucie Blok
Myriam Henkens
Riekje Elema
Saskia van der Kam
In addition, numerous 'corridor
consultations' took place with people to
verify and check information. 
A selection of key documents were
reviewed and consulted. The following is
a partial list: 
Vijf Jaar Artsen Zonder Grenzen. Een
overzicht van de activiteiten. 1989.
Haan A, Lute E, Bender R. Médecins Sans
Frontières. 10 Years Emergency Aid
Worldwide. 
Annual Reports 1988-90, 1991, 1992,
1994
MSF Activity Reports 1990, 1992-2002
PHD Annual Plans 2000-9 
MSF-Holland Annual Plans 1988-2003
Co-days Reports: 1990, 1999-2001, 2003-
10
Strategy documents:
• 1987 en verder…” Beleidsnota mei
1987. Artsen zonder Grenzen
• “MSF in the 1990s: Vision, desirability
and maintainability” (Artsen zonder
Grenzen in de jaren '90: visie,
wenselijkheid en houdbaarheid). 1989.
• “MSF in the 1990s: Decisiveness,
involvement and independence”. Policy
Memorandum, MSF-Holland, 1993. 
• “MSF in 2000: Towards relevance and
impact in the next century” (Artsen
zonder Grenzen in 2000: Naar relevantie
en impact in de volgende eeuw)
• Medium Term Policy MSF-Holland 200-
2002.
• Medium Term Policy MSF-Holland
01/2003-12/2005 “Fighting to Care”
• Medium Term Plan Public Health
Department 2003-2005
• MSF-OCA Strategic Plan 2007-2010
Policy papers and internal reflections: 
• Orbinski J. Emergency Public Health: An
internal Qualitative Survey. Summer 1995.
• De Graaf P. Emergency Public Health for
MSF: a summary. 3 November 1995.
• MSF and Tuberculosis Policy Paper. April
1995. 
• Watsan Desk. 1984-1996: A look back
at Watsan at MSF-H. November 1997. 
• De Jong, K. Mental Health Policy, 1998.
• Gaanderse M. Challenges in Urban
Slums. November 1998. 
• Workshop on Public Health and Human
Rights. Final Report of the Workshop held
in Amsterdam. The Netherlands. 17
December 1998.
• Sexual Violence Guideline. 1999.
• Veeken H. MSF and Malaria into the
21st Century: A Policy Paper. April 2001.
• Hook C. MSF Policy on Falciparum
Malaria, 21 October 2002. 
• MSF-Holland Action plan for ACT
implementation, version dated 13 January
2003
• MSF-Holland. ACT Action Plan 2003:
Planning of ACT implementation per
country, dated 27 February 2003.
• O'Neil H. MSFH Guide for HQ and field
workers on: “Operational Response to
Sexual Violence in our existing
programmes”. Oct 2003. 
• User fees - Dying for growth. Jan 2004
• Offering HIV/AIDS Treatment and care:
Experience from MSF-Holland
programmes 2003-2006. May 2007.
• McMaster P. A Surgery Strategy for MSF
in Iraq. January 2008.
Evaluations:
Soeters R. Famine Relief Northern Darfur.
Evaluation of a supplementary Feeding
Program for MSF-H. Second edition. Feb
1986. 
Timmermans N. Internal Evaluation of
MSF-Holland projects in the Gaza Strip,
Occupied Palestinian Territories, June 1990
to January 1995.
Veeken H, Meijman B. An internal
evaluation of the MSF
distribution/monitoring project in Bosnia
(period: Sept. 1991-Sept. 1994).  January
1995.
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The MSF
Drug Distribution Programme in Bosnia:
1991-1996. April 1998
Oudman M. Environmental Health for the
Displaced in Greater Khartoum, Sudan.
1992-1998.  Evaluation Report.  January
1999. 
Queen Margaret University College,
Edinburgh. A Study of the Operational
Constraints and Opportunities for Mental
Health Programs within MSF-H.  March
1999.
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit.
Evaluation of the MSF Holland programs in
Burma (Myanmar). 1993-1998. March
1999.
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. Natural
Disasters in MSF Holland, a framework for
analysis and action. Sept 1999. 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. MSF-H
Workshop Report. Nutritional interventions
in open situations. Evaluating the
experiences in West-Darfur, North-Sudan.
Jan 2002. 
Ellman T. Evaluation of Tuberculosis
Treatment in Lankien, South Sudan. The
2001 Pilot Cohort. August 2002. 
Cunningham D. Lessons Learned Exercise of
MSF-Holland Programs in Cambodia.
December 2002. 
Evaluation of Supplementary Feeding
Programs in Darfur, Somalia and Uganda.
MSF-H. October 2005.
Porte B. Evaluation Report: Response to
Natural Disaster: Transversal evaluation of
seven OCG interventions in 2007. June
2008. 25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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Appendix 2
Time Line
20 December 1971
A group of French doctors found
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the first
non-military, non-governmental
organisation to specialise in emergency
medical assistance.
1984
MSF-H is established in Amsterdam on 7
September. 
Somalia: First project by MSF-H. Cholera
intervention in Gannad Refugee Camp
under direction of MSF-Belgium.
1985
Sudan: MSF-H first independent mission
opens in Darfur to respond to famine
with a supplementary feeding programme
and primary health care programme. 
1986
The board accepts adding rehabilitation
projects to MSF-H's emergency assistance
role.
1987 
Suriname: MSF-H is expelled from
Suriname as MSF's medical aid to the
rebel territory is seen as collaborating
with the enemy.
Somalia: The first surgical programme is
started in Sheik, Somalia. After 14
months, the team is forced to evacuate as
fighting overtakes the town and
surrounding areas.  
1988 
The voluntary medical working group is
replaced with the Medical Scientific
Department which will eventually become
the Public Health Department.
Sudan: First kala azar treatment
programme in response to the outbreak
amongst south Sudanese refugees living
outside Khartoum. 
1989
The Health Emergency Preparation (HEP)
course begins as a pre-departure course
for medical and para-medical volunteers.
1990
Gaza:  Assessment done for first mental
health programme in December.
Programme opens in 1991.
1991
Uganda: First MSF-H AIDS project starts in
Soroti as National AIDS programme is
unable to reach the area due to insecurity.
The focus is on prevention of infection. 
Draft Malaria Policy is formulated.
MSF-H decides to focus work on
emergency medical assistance in the so-
called ABC discussions. A new NGO,
HealthNet International, is started to take
over the longer term 'C' projects.
1992
A psychologist starts working in the office
to brief and de-brief expats and deal with
mental health of MSF staff.
1993
The Medical Department is no longer
represented on the Management Team.
The re-structuring of the top layer of the
organisation has the objective of
improved decisiveness and flexibility to
reflect the emergency nature of the
organisation.  The medical department is
now represented by the manager of the
Operations cluster.
The concept of Emergency Public Health
(EPH) is developed. It becomes one of the
three core competencies of MSF-H, along
with logistical decisiveness and
deployment of flexible, sufficient and
committed staff.
A peer support network to provide
psychosocial support to expats is
established.
1994
Rwanda: Genocide starts on 6 April.  
MSF Nutritional Guidelines published.
1995
First MSF TB policy is agreed
intersectionally.  It advises against
treatment in emergency or refugee
settings unless strict pre-conditions are
met. 
An intersectional meeting in Chantilly
adds témoignage and witnessing to the
organisation's core mission.
1996
Myanmar: First ACT administered in an
MSF-H programme.  
Operational policies for water and
sanitation projects developed.
1998
The new Public Health Department is
formed through a merger of the Medical
Department, the Humanitarian Affairs
Department and the WatSan Unit. 
1999 
The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to MSF
for its medical work and for standing up
for people in need. 
MSF International launches the Campaign
for Access to Essential Medicines (CAME). 
Formation of Operational Support Teams
(OSTs) to provide support to the field
teams.
A guideline on emergency treatment of
rape is written. It states that post-
exposure prophylaxis for HIV infection is
rarely feasible in MSF settings, and further
that it is not the role of MSF to perform
abortions. 
2000
Ukraine:  First PMTCT program starts
using zidovudine in the third trimester
and nevirapine for mother and infant.
MSF Policy for Procurement of medical
products paper is agreed by the
international medical directors. It makes
international procurement of
pharmaceuticals the standard for all
missions.
2001
AIDS advisor is recruited.
2002
Ukraine: First ART delivered to children in
PMTCT programme. ART to adults starts
in Odessa in 2003.
The new intersectional MSF malaria policy
advocates the introduction of ACT in all
field sites.
2003
Congo-Brazzaville: Protocol for NECT trial
submitted to MSF's ERB in January. Study
is executed in six centres by partners
DNDi and Epicentre. Results lead to a
change in protocol for treatment of
sleeping sickness.
DRC:  First HIV programme to provide
ART in conflict settings starts enrolment of
ART patients in October in Bukavu
project. 
Uzbekistan: Start of the first MDR-TB
(DOTS+) pilot programme.
The PHD hires its first lab advisor.
The Manson's Unit is created in London as
MSF-UK's expression of shared
operationality. The first task of the new
medical 'innovation unit' is to support
implementation of the ACT policy in the
field.25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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2004
Five MSF-H staff members are killed in
Afghanistan and MSF stops operations in
the country. 
2005
The Water, Hygiene and Sanitation (WHS)
Policy is adopted, stating MSF's
responsibility to intervene where poor
WHS conditions lead to significant
mortality and morbidity, and where no
other actors are responding.  
2006
An epidemiologist joins the department.
On 1 October 2006, MSF-Holland and
MSF sections in Canada, Germany and
the UK start the Operational Centre
Amsterdam (MSF-OCA).
2007
New nutritional strategies are introduced.
Key changes are widening admission
criteria to TFPs with a phase out of
supplementary feeding programmes.  
A full-time surgical advisor joins the
department in December.
2008
Three MSF-OCA staff members are killed
in a targeted attack in Kismayo, Somalia.
TB strategy paper is adopted stating the
ambition to offer MDR-TB diagnosis and
treatment in all TB programs. 
A full time Reproductive Health Advisor is
added to the department. 
2009
Sudan: MSF-OCA is expelled from a
country for the second time in its history.
The decision comes shortly after the
International Criminal Court issues an
arrest warrant for Sudanese President
Omar Al Bashir. The Sudanese
government mistakenly accuses MSF of
cooperating with the International Court. 
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The table represents the overview of
publications with a MSF-H/MSF-OCA
author between 1984 and 2010.  Each
publication was classified on the basis of
the primary topic. Research articles are
those presenting primary data.
Commentary is a broad category that
includes articles written as commentaries
or perspective pieces, viewpoints, reviews,
editorials, or MSF-authored news.  The
peer review column is determined on the
basis of whether a journal is currently
peer reviewed.  
Publications are written in English, except
for 6% in Dutch.  No publications were
made in French, despite a concentration
of MSF programs in French speaking
regions. There were several papers
submitted to regional journals, however
these journals were often not peer
reviewed.  While there is good reason to
publish in international journals, it does
raise the question as to whether the
research findings are available to local
medical communities and researchers
where the language in not English.
Approximately one third of the
publications from the last two years were
published in open access journals.
Recently MSF publications are made
available on the website, MSF Field
Research
1, in an effort to improve
accessibility of the research.  
The research section includes 25 clinical
trials defined as prospective studies which
assign a group or group of participants to
an intervention or interventions. This
represents 20% of the research articles.
The MSF-OCA operational research
framework, states: “MSF involvement in
"clinical trials" should be rare and well
justified, given the complex ethical issues
involved, and trials/studies proposing new
treatments/regimens will be
exceptional.
2” 
Clinical trials involving new treatment
were performed almost exclusively in the
area of neglected disease where there are
few other research actors and where MSF
has unique access to these neglected
patient populations.   
The topic division shows that most papers
are linked to infectious diseases or
neglected diseases.  Malaria is the most
common topic in infectious diseases.
Secondary topic division reveals that
many of the publications are linked to
diagnostics, particularly for kala azar and
tuberculosis. 
Topic Total Type Peer-reviewed
Commentary Research
Environmental Health 7 1 6 7(100%)
General Humanitarian 24 21 3 22(92%)
Infectious Diseases 66 10 56 60(92%)
HIV 17 5 12 15(100%)
TB 17 2 15 17(100%)
Malaria 24 2 22 20(83%)
Other Infectious Diseases 8 1 7 7(88%)
Nutrition 5 3 2 2(40%)
Neglected Diseases 51 11 40 49(96%)
HAT 5 1 4 5(100%)
KA 44 9 35 42(95%)
Other 2 1 1 2(100%)
Mental Health 25 5 20 20(80%)
Other 6 4 2 5(83%)
TOTAL: 184 55 129 165(90%)
Appendix 4
Publications analysis
1 http://fieldresearch.msf.org/msf/
2 Framework for research in MSF-OCA. 2008. Annex 1.
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Paediatrics
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Appendix 6
Timelines for progress in ACT implementation in seven countries where MSF-H is operating
Appendix 5
Human Resources overview
The graph above illustrates the relative
proportion of international medical
doctors and paramedical staffs posted to
the field.  There may be variability in how
the figures are calculated over the years.
Targets for the re-medicalisation ambition
are for greater than 20% of medical
doctors and 55% overall for the
combination of doctors and paramedical
staff. 
From: An Evaluation of the Process of Artemisinin Combination Therapy Implementation Within MSF-Holland Field Sites as
Supported by the Manson Unit: 2002-2004. Caroline Lynch and Arnemarieter Veen, January, 2006.
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1987-1990
“1987 and Beyond….”
Professionalisation  
Desire to expand
number of projects
Currently too dependent
on institutional donors
Cooperation with other
sections
“Coordinator problem” -
limited availability of
more experienced
coordinators  willing to
make long-term
commitment
Availability of volunteers
Available funds
Appendix 7
Summary of medium term policies/strategic plans
1993-1996
“MSF in the 1990s:
Decisiveness, involvement
and independence”
Growth of the
organisation
Implementation of new
management structure
for HQ
Strengthen relation
between management
and support
departments
Collapse of the Cold War
power blocks and
changing nature of
conflicts
Labour market for
medical emergency aid
remains tight
1996-2000
“MSF in 2000: towards
relevance in the next
century”
Integrating “witnessing”
in MSF's activities
Maintain 'volunteer
atmosphere' of the
organisation
Need for increased
cooperation with
partner organisations
External offices in
Canada, England and
Germany
Humanitarian aid
increasingly used as a
political tool
More complex conflict
situations due to
collapse of the Cold War
power blocks
Growing medical needs:
TB, AIDS, cholera, etc
Urbanisation creating
possible contexts for
intervention
Increasing security
threats in the field
Growing number of aid
agencies
Decreasing availability
of qualified medical staff
Dates
Theme 
Objective
Internal challenges
External Challenges 
1990-1993
“MSF in the 1990s:
Vision, desirability and
maintainability”
Improve quality
Consolidating
organisational  growth 
Preventing bureaucracy 
Decentralise decision-
making
Changing North-South
relations
Slums and
environmental disasters
may change medical
needs in the future25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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1987-1990
How to measure impact
of MSF's medical
programmes?
Growth
Take on structural/
developmental projects
yes/no? 
Need to increase
exploratory missions
1993-1996
Develop Emergency
Public Health
Integrate non-medical
activities (Watsan,
nutrition)  in medical
programming
Adapt medical
intervention models for
open settings
Guidelines for malaria,
TB, AIDS 
Strengthen MSF's
humanitarian role and
non-political identity
Aftercare of fieldworkers
New management
structure consisting of
four managers:
operations( includes
Medical Dept), HRM,
control and marketing &
comms
Aim for zero growth in
project turnover to allow
consolidation of quality,
development of
competences
No further involvement
in C projects:
Health Net International
set up in 1992 for “C-
projects”
1996-2000
Ambition to increase
impact, by improving
the quality of
interventions
Further develop the
Emergency Public
Health concept in the
areas of psychosocial
care, nutrition and
infectious diseases
Develop the ability to
respond to increasing
drug resistance,
increasing frequency
and size of epidemics,
emerging pandemics,
food crisis and
psychosocial care
Develop new Watsan
intervention models,
including distribution
through pipes, wells
and trucking
Guiding principles as laid
down in the Chantilly
document (1995)
Strengthen medical
identity of MSF
New organisational
structure: decentralisation
of responsibilities to the
field (Field Driven
Model).
New management
structure with four
operational directors, a
director of resources and
a general director in the
MT
Instead of ABC project
focus, now a typology of
four intervention types:
Projects focused on acute
survival, projects in
(chronic) conflict settings,
projects in non-conflict,
rehabilitation
Dates
Medical themes
Hot topics
Internal
organisation/
Operational models
1990-1993
Prioritisation :
Basic healthcare
provision in (acute and
chronic ) conflict/
refugee setting (top-
priority)
Develop capacity to
respond to acute
epidemics (medium
priority)
Respond to chronic
epidemics :malaria, TB,
AIDS (no priority)
Develop Watsan and
nutrition components as
part of the medical
programmes.
Growth of the
organisation
Projects require “needs-
assessments” and
planning and evaluation
throughout the project
National staff to occupy
more responsible
positionsSummary of medium term policies/strategic plans (part 2)
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1987-1990
Increase fundraising
from private sources
Develop PR strategy
Strategy to retain
coordinators 
1993-1996
At least 50 percent of
funding from private
donors
1996-2000 Dates
Support
requirements
1990-1993
Diversification of
institutional funding
HR development 
2000 - 2002
“To be present, relevant and
effective in the important
humanitarian crises of the day”
Catalyst for change:
confronting the causes of
humanitarian crisis.
New World Order: privatisation,
deregulation and technology
leads to increasing social
exclusion of the poor
Wars mutating into new and
bizarre forms of extreme
violence making access more
difficult
Growing number of aid
agencies and UN agencies
Loss of respect for
independent, impartial and
neutral humanitarian action:
co-opting of humanitarian
agenda
Emergence of new diseases and
resurgence of old diseases
Ageing populations and chronic
disease burden
Front line media coverage
2007-2010
Strategic Plan 2007-2010
Aim to be present in all major
humanitarian crises,
conducting relevant and high
quality operations.
Global political focus on
terrorism, nuclear proliferation,
organised crime, poverty, and
infectious disease
Greater difficulty negotiating
independent access and less
space for direct and impartial
humanitarian assistance
Humanitarian assistance being
made conditional on longer-
term objectives towards
addressing poverty, “fragile
states,” and nation building
Effects of global climate
change
Dates
Theme 
Objective
External Challenges
2003-2005+
“Fighting to Care”
(Re-)focus on medical needs
and responsibilities, increase
projects that facilitate direct
contact between MSF doctors
and patients, quality of care
Collapse of public health
systems (deterioration of
facilities, absence of supplies
and shortage of staff); no real
belief anymore that all people
should have access to
healthcare
Humanitarianism co-opted by
political objectives
Politics of fear and isolationism
leading to clash of cultures and
religions
HIV represents single most
important medical challenge of
the generation25 years of Medical Humanitarian Action
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2000 - 2002
Medical ethics
Focus on broad and flexible
understanding of emergency
public health
Catalyst for change
Exit strategies
Proximity of volunteers 
No change in management
structure to allow focus on
internal culture, spirit
Targets for MDs/paramedicals
in field, line management,
management teams
Upgrading of recruitment,
retention and staff
development
Ethical investment of reserves
Commitment to complete
transparency/accountability to
donors/members
2007-2010
Emergency response and
epidemics 
Surgical, sexual violence care,
and mental health programs
for direct victims of violence
Major causes of mortality -
malaria, respiratory and
diarrhoeal disease, HIV and TB,
obstetric emergencies, and
vaccine-preventable and
neglected diseases
Greater focus on reproductive
health
OCA development 
Direct medical effects of
violence
Responsiveness
OCA development as a model
of co-ownership
Translate MSF values into an
internal culture for OCA
Position the OCA as
responsible employer
Reinforcing logistical
decisiveness and strengthening
logistical capacity
Development and innovation
in information &
communication technology
Enhanced control, learning,
and accountability
Dates
Medical themes 
Hot topics
Internal organisation
Support requirements
2003-2005+
Usual killers of crisis victims -
measles, malnutrition,
diarrhoea, and respiratory tract
infection
Pandemics - HIV/AIDS, TB, and
malaria
Forgotten diseases - sleeping
sickness, kala azar and Chagas
Potable water, sanitation, food
and shelter
Psychosocial care
Operational research on new
diagnostics and treatment
protocols (15 percent of
resources dedicated to OR and
pilot projects)
Access to essential medicine
Humanitarian action as an act
of protest
Definition of “good standard of
care”
Extreme importance of medical
perspectives in operational
choices and organisational
policy
Focus on increasing number of
medical doctors in the field and
HQ
Recruiting the right motivated
staff, placing them well,
allowing them to develop their
own humanitarian position,
and keeping them in the field
and HQPhoto: © Misha Friedman